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Recent firefighter line of duty deaths as a result of rapid fire progression have
highlighted that there is a deficiency in firefighters’ understanding of the fire dy-
namics created by modern, synthetic fuels on the fireground, and how their tactics
may influence these conditions. In particular, the rapid growth of these modern
fires, their response to ventilation, and their propensity to become underventilated
have changed when compared to their legacy counterparts. Among the reasons for
this gap in understanding is the way in which firefighters conduct live fire training.
Typical fuels used for firefighter training, such as pallets and straw, are more typ-
ical of legacy fuels than modern, synthetic fuels, however. Recognizing this, many
instructors have begun to introduce synthetic materials into live fire training, in an
effort to make the training feel more realistic. While these fuels may exhibit fire
behavior more representative of a room and contents fire with modern furnishings,
they also create the potential for hazardous conditions for firefighters. A series of
eight experiments was conducted in a concrete fire training building. Two training
fuel packages were considered. The first consisted of wooden pallets and straw, a
common fire training fuel. The second introduced oriented strand board (OSB) to
the pallets and straw fuel package. Both of these training fuels were compared to a
room with furnishings similar to those that may be found in a residential home. The
results indicated that pallets and straw fail to replicate the high radiant heat flux,
underventilated conditions, and rapid response to additional ventilation that was
noted in the furnished room fire. Further, since the concrete training building had
several built-in ventilation points, and additional ventilation resulted in no increase
in thermal conditions, the pallets and straw training fires could be considered fuel
limited. In the OSB experiments, on the other hand, a limited growth secondary to
ventilation was observed. Thus, the OSB fires represent a more realistic simulation
of a furnished room fire than the pallets and straw. In addition to increased fidelity,
the OSB training fires exhibited more severe thermal conditions, which would pose a
greater hazard to students and instructors than in the pallets and straw evolutions.
Thus, if fire instructors should elect to include synthetic materials, such as OSB,
into live fire training evolutions, additional precautions must be taken to ensure that
participants are not exposed to excessive thermal conditions. Likewise, if instruc-
tors choose pallets and straw as a training fuel because of the increased margin of
safety, special emphasis must be placed on the difference in fire behavior between
the training fuel and the modern, synthetic fuels that would be encountered on the
fireground.
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Chapter 1: Motivation
Several noteworthy firefighter line of duty deaths and injuries have occurred
in recent years on the fireground as a result of rapid fire progression [1–4]. Among
the contributing factors to these incidents was a lack of understanding of fire be-
havior [1–3]. Recent studies on firefighter safety [5, 6] have identified that the shift
towards a higher synthetic content in modern home furnishings has resulted in fires
with higher heat release rates than legacy fuels, which were composed mostly of
natural materials. This shift has resulted in a more unforgiving fireground, where
poorly timed actions such as uncoordinated ventilation can result in the rapid dete-
rioration of conditions. Unfortunately, fire department tactics do not always reflect
this changing fire environment. Among other considerations, the necessity for fire-
fighters to understand the fire dynamics that they are likely to encounter on the
fireground has been identified as essential for firefighter safety.
Although the fuels found in the modern residential home have evolved to
become comprised mostly of synthetic materials, the fuels that firefighters use to
practice live fire training are still more representative of legacy fuels. National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) 1403: Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions is
the NFPA document which outlines the methods that should be used and precau-
1
tions that should be taken for live fire training scenarios [7]. The standard limits
the types of fuels that can be used to wood based fuels. As a result of this restric-
tion, wooden pallets and straw are a common training fuel that is used for such
evolutions. Pallets and straw have long been used as an economical training fuel for
fire training facilities because they are easy to procure and create a predictable fire.
However, some academies and training groups have recognized that the conditions
produced by these pallets and straw training fires are not representative of those ob-
served in residential fires. Thus, in an effort to replicate the conditions experienced
on the modern fire ground, these organizations have begun to incorporate differ-
ent fuels into their live fire training evolutions, including engineered lumber, such
as pressboard, particleboard, and oriented strand board (OSB). These engineered
wood products combine glues or resins with smaller pieces of wood to form larger
sheets or boards. The higher synthetic content of engineered wood produces more
severe thermal conditions than traditional pallets and straw training fires, while still
nominally remaining compliant with NFPA 1403.
The introduction of these new fuels into the training environment raises the
issue of balancing the fidelity of training fires with the safety of participating in such
burns. Many instructors assume that producing a training fire with high fidelity
invloves replicating thermal conditions that are of a similar severity as those that
students would encounter on the fire ground. As the training fuel package is modified
to produce conditions consistent with a furnished room, the thermal environment
becomes more hazardous. It is important that the thermal hazard of the training
environment is considered, as several firefighter line of duty deaths have resulted
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from excessive thermal exposure during training evolutions [8–10]. Rather than
mirroring the conditions experienced in a residential home using modern fuels, the
goal should be to simulate the response of the fire to firefighter tactics. This will
minimize the potential of forming bad habits as a result of low-fidelity live fire
training, while still preserving a reasonable margin of safety.
This series of experiments aims to compare the fire dynamics produced by
two training fuels with the fire dynamics resultant from furniture common to a
modern home. In particular, this investigation will focus on training fire evolutions
in concrete buildings, similar to those found at many training academies across the
United States. In addition to comparing the thermal conditions that result from
the training fuels, the effect of various firefighter tactics on these conditions will be
examined. The thermal hazard in locations in the training structure that firefighters
may be positioned will be considered as well.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
NFPA 1403: Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions outlines the require-
ments for live fire evolutions in acquired and fixed facility training structures [7].
The document discusses the responsibilities of the instructors, safety officers, and
participants, and also provides guidelines for the types of fuels that can be included
in the fuel package. The standard specifically forbids treated wood products, rub-
ber, plastic, polyurethane foam, upholstered furniture, and chemically treated straw
as fuels. Furthermore, the documents advises that the fuel load should be limited to
mitigate the potential for backdraft or flashover. NFPA 1403 additionally makes sev-
eral specific recommendations for acquired structure training burns. The standard
recommends against the use of low-density particleboard and unidentified materials
found within the structure. Furthermore, the document mandates that combustible
materials not included in the fuel load should be moved to an area of the structure
remote from the fire room. The 2017 Edition of NFPA 1403 additionally requires a
thorough understanding of fire behavior and the impact of ventilation on fire dynam-
ics. The standard emphasizes that students must be familiar with the basic physical
and chemical concepts behind combustion and compartment fire behavior, and must
be able to identify potential thermal hazards within the building. Previous versions
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of the standard do not discuss the importance of fire dynamics concepts [11,12].
NFPA 1403 was developed in response to a live fire training accident in 1982
that resulted in the deaths of two firefighters in order to offer a standard means
of conducting live fire operations safely in both fixed-facility and acquired burn
structures. Despite the procedures and precautions contained in NFPA 1403, there
have been several instances where firefighters have been killed or injured during live
fire evolutions. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
investigated several of these incidents, which are described below.
In a 2005 incident in Pennsylvania, which would attract further studies into
the hazards of the training fire environment, NIOSH led an investigation into the
death of a 47-year-old fire instructor. The instructor experienced a catastrophic
failiure of his facepiece lens during a live-fire “Train the Trainer” course, and died of
thermal injuries two days after the event. The burn building was a 2.5 story concrete
block structure. Investigators attributed the facepiece failure to the high thermal
conditions that were present in the basement during the evolution. The investiga-
tion emphasized the importance of using the minimum amount of fuel necessary to
perform live-fire training while maintaining firefighter safety. Additionally, this in-
cident demonstrated the dangers of repeated evolutions without allowing sufficient
time between evolutions for the burn building to cool down [9].
In a 2007 incident which occurred in Maryland, a female probationary fire-
fighter was killed during a training evolution in a vacant end-of-the-row townhouse.
The scenario used approximately 12 wooden pallets and 11 bales of hay as fuel,
and featured fire sets on all three floors of the townhouse. The victim was on the
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nozzle of the first hoseline, and was instructed to bypass the fires on the first and
second floors and make an attack on the third floor fire. when the attack team
reached the stairway between the second and third floors, they were overcome by
the high heat conditions. The instructor and backup firefighter exited the struc-
ture through a window. The victim reached the window, but was unable to get
the lower half of her body out of the window. While the instructor was trying to
remove her from the fire room through the window, her mask became dislodged.
She was finally removed when another instructor came up the stairs and helped her
legs through the window. The victim succumbed to thermal injuries and asphyxia.
NIOSH attributed the outcome of the incident to several factors, including a lack
of equipment, a lack of physical fitness performance requirements, and a failure to
follow the requirements of NFPA 1403 [8].
Two career firefighters were killed in a training fire in an acquired structure
in Florida. The structure was a one-story, single family house with three bedrooms,
two bathrooms, and a kitchen. The fire was ignited in one of the bedrooms, and had
a fuel load of wooden pallets, straw, and a urethane foam mattress. Before ignition,
other materials in the room, such as urethane foam padding, hollow core wood
doors, and carpeting were not removed, and thus contributed to the fuel load. Four
firefighters acted as interior safeties throughout the duration of the incident. The
victims entered the structure first, to perform a primary search of the building. They
were followed by the attack line. The victims passed the safety/ignition officer that
was positioned outside of the fire room, who retreated to the living room to help the
attack company while the victims proceeded to search the fire room. Before applying
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water, the fire room window was vented and dark, heavy smoke exited the window.
The attack company began to apply water in short bursts, and one of the safety
officers exited the structure, thinking that he had been “steamed.” The victims
remained unaccounted for for several minutes. During this time, it is suspected
that the fire room flashed over. After the victims failed to acknowledge repeated
attempts by the Incident Commander (IC) to contact them, the IC activated the
rapid intervention team (RIT), who found the victims in the fire room. They were
transported to a local hospital and pronounced dead. The investigation identified
the fuel load and uncoordinated ventilation as contributing factors, noting that
the use of fuel with unknown burning characteristics can lead to unexpected fire
development and rapid fire progression [13].
In another line of duty death incident, A New York volunteer firefighter was
killed during a simulated “mayday” scenario, where he and another firefighter were
playing the simulated victims. The victim had very little training prior to the
incident, and had never worn an self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) under
live fire conditions before. The training was conducted in a vacant two story duplex.
The scenario simulated two firefighters being trapped in an upstairs bedroom in
one half of the duplex, and involved the engine and rescue company making entry
through the other half of the duplex, breaching a wall, and rescuing the downed
firefighters. The intended fuel source was a burn barrel in one of the bedrooms, but
an assistant chief ignited a foam mattress when the ignition firefighter had trouble
igniting the burn barrels. The ignition of the mattress led to rapid fire growth
and caused conditions throughout the duplex to deteriorate. The ignition firefighter
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attempted to help the two trapped firefighters, but in the process lost his gloves,
received burns to his hands, and was forced to exit out of a second story window.
When the engine and rescue companies arrived on scene, they both acted as RIT
teams, and removed the trapped firefighters from the structure. The victim was
transported to a local hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The other firefighter
that was removed from the structure and the ignition firefighter that jumped from
the second floor were flown to a regional burn center. The investigation highlighted
the importance of not using live victims during live fire training and ensuring that
the fuels used in training burns are in accordance with NFPA 1403 [10].
Incidents such as these highlight the debate within the fire service about bal-
ancing safety requirements, such as those recommended in NFPA 1403, with realistic
fire training that prepares recruits for the modern fire ground. Many articles pub-
lished in fire service trade magazines, such as that written by Greg Fisher, empha-
size the importance of conducting training that adheres to the guidelines of NFPA
1403 [7]. Fisher cautions against including loose trim, furnishings, and debris in the
fuel package, as was done in acquired structure burns for many years. The inclusion
of such materials, whose compostion may be unknown, can lead to unpredictable
fire behavior. In addition to removing loose materials from the acquired structure,
Fisher stresses discretion when determining the size of the fire set. He points out
that fuel sets that are larger than the students are comfortable with may cause stu-
dents to panic, invalidating the training. When constructing a fire set with pallets,
Fisher highlights geometry as an important factor. The pallets and straw should
be arranged in a corner so that the fuels are located as close to the ceiling of the
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room as possible. Such an arrangement will allow for the fire to rapidly reach a
fully developed stage, and will mimic the fire dynamics of a room and contents fire.
Fisher adds that it is important to monitor for window and ceiling failure during
the training evolution, as these events may cause unwanted changes in fire behavior.
Thus, the students’ safety and comfort level should be prime considerations in the
orchestration of an acquired structure training burn [14].
In an article by Kriss Garcia and Reinhard Kauffman [15], they highlight some
of the challenges of conducting acquired structure training. The authors describe an
instance where hours of work were put in to prepare a building for a live burn, only to
find that the previous owner of the house had plastered over layers of medium-density
particleboard, concealing the engineered wood board and leading to unexpected
fire growth. The article presents instructions for a makeshift acquired structure,
comprised of dimensional lumber and gypsum board walls. The authors maintain
that this “build and burn” prop provides students with a safer and more realistic
fire training experience by combining the realistic building materials and geometry
of acquired structures with the predictability and more controlled environment of
fixed-facility burn structures. The authors describe the standard fuel package that
they use as consisting of five pallets. The first two pallets are leaned against each
other diagonally, the second two are oriented vertically next to the first two, and
the fifth pallet is laid across the top of the bottom four. The authors recommend
that this fuel package should be placed in the center of the fire room, where it
will generate enough energy to bring the room to flashover and realistic amounts of
combustion products [15].
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Forest Reeder presents the debate within the fire service about balancing the
need for realistic training with safety requirements in his article [16]. Reeder high-
lights some of the frequent complaints that are voiced against the standard. Some
instructors are frustrated that NFPA 1403 prohibits what they consider to be more
realistic training evolutions, with more smoke and higher heat conditions. These
instructors feel that the standard is too restrictive, and that the safety requirements
invalidate the training experience. These instructors argue that Class A and gas-
fired training fires do not create realistic smoke or heat conditions, leaving recruits
unprepared for the high heat conditions frequently seen on the modern fire ground.
Reeder emphasizes that the safety requirements that some see as overbearing or
restrictive are necessary to prevent tragic accidents in live fire evolutions. Further-
more, building the fire sets so that heat and smoke conditions are unbearably high
may instill the idea that such high heat conditions are acceptable, leaving recruits
vulnerable to rapid fire events on the fire ground. Reeder maintains that control
and pre-planning are important facets of a successful live fire training evolution [16].
Among the common factors among the line of duty death incidents described
above is the improper use of training fuels. In several of the acquired structure burns,
the addition of debris found around the house had the effect of increasing the fire
size beyond what was manageable or expected. The articles by Reeder and Fisher
indicate that a possible motive for these increased fuels loads was to make the train-
ing fire “hotter” and “more realistic.” In the Pennsylvania Fire Academy incident,
the victim was exposed to repeated, high intensity thermal exposures which resulted
in the failure of his personal protective equipment (PPE). A poor understanding of
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the thermal conditions that these fuel loads would produce led to the deaths in
these instances. In an effort to better understand the training fuels that firefighters
use, a series of research studies have aimed to quantify parts of the training fire
environment.
Madryzkowski et al. investigated a pair of training fires in which firefighters
had been killed. The first incident occurred during an acquired structure burn in
Florida, where two firefighters died while conducting a search when the fire room
flashed over [13]. NIST recreated the fire room and two adjacent spaces, and eval-
uated the thermal conditions caused by five different combinations of fuel load and
ventilation conditions. The results indicated that flashover conditions were reached
for each fuel load, including the experiment where only pallets, straw,wood mold-
ing, and a hollow core door were used. Furthermore, the temperatures exceeded
260◦C and the heat fluxes exceeded 20 kW/m2 during each test, indicating that
the thermal conditions in the fire room were unsurvivable for even a firefighter in
full PPE. An additional experiment examined the heat release rate of the pallets
and straw, which was found to be 2.8 MW [17]. The authors compared this heat
release rate to the theoretical heat release rate required for flashover in the room,
and found that the HRR was sufficient to cause flashover. The second incident that
was investigated occurred in Pennsylvania, during a “train the trainer” class. After
the last burn of the day, an instructor was found lying face-down on the floor in the
basement with damage to his facepiece. He later succumbed to his injuries. NIST
instrumented the burn building where the incident occurred and attempted to recre-
ate the thermal conditions that were present at the time of the instructor’s death.
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Thermocouples wereThey first used a fuel load of pallets and excelsior to “preheat”
the burn structure. After that, additional pallets and straw were added. When
the fires peaked, the fuel was suppressed with a hose stream and the compartment
was hydraulically ventilated. Once the compartment was cleared, additional pallets
were added to the embers, and the process was repeated. The ambient heat flux
at 1.5 m from the ceiling before the last evolution was 6 kW/m2, and the ambient
temperature in the burn structure was 150◦C at 1.53 m below the ceilings. It is
suspected that the actual heat flux and temperature experienced by the victim was
higher than these values, since the victim was standing at the time that the damage
occurred, and the upper half of his body would have been positioned higher in the
room than the height at which these measurements were obtianed. Laboratory ex-
periments indicated that 6 pallets and straw had a peak heat release rate of 4.5 MW.
In both fatal training fire incidents, the thermal conditions that resulted from the
fuel loads exceeded the protective capabilities of the firefighters’ personal protective
equipment. This highlights the the necessity of using discretion when determining
the fuel load of training fires.
Lannon and Milke [18] ran a series of CFAST [19] simulations to assess the
hazards presented to firefighters during training fires. The authors compared these
models to training fires experiments that had been previously conducted by the
Maryland Fire Rescue Institute and the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology. When the data from one of the pallet burns was compared to the results
of the computer model for an identical pallet configuration, the temperature and
heat flux data were found to be similar. The zone model used in the simulation was
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CFAST, and the simulations examined a triangular orientation of pallets and ex-
celsior, a pile of excelsior with no pallets, stacked pallets oriented horizontally both
with and without excelsior, and vertically stacked pallets with excelsior. The sim-
ulations indicated that the vertically configured pallets exhibited the highest heat
release rate of the pallet configurations. Additionally, when horizontal ventilation
was introduced, the temperatures and heat fluxes throughout the concrete burn
building decreased rapidly. The authors also examined the effects of multiple burns
in close succession. The results indicated that repeated burns precipitate more haz-
ardous thermal conditions in later evolutions. The authors cautioned that, when
conducting live fire training, instructors should allow for sufficient time between
burns for the structure to cool down to safe levels.
Willi et al [20] conducted a series of experiments to quantify the thermal ex-
posure of firefighters in a training environment. The authors constructed a portable
data acquisition system that was capable of gathering heat flux and temperature
data on a firefighter during a training exercise. The tests examined two types of
firefighter training evolutions: scenarios conducted in concrete burn buildings, us-
ing wooden pallets and straw as a fuel load, and a metal container-based training
prop known as a “flashover simulator”, which had a fuel load consisting of pallets,
straw, oriented strand board (OSB) and medium density particleboard. The results
indicated that routine training evolutions exhibited heat fluxes on the order of 1
kW/m2 and temperatures close to 50◦C,whereas more severe exposures showed heat
fluxes between 3 and 6 kW/m2 and temperatures between 150◦C and 200◦C. Fur-
thermore, the experiments showed that, in some instances, the temperature under
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predicted the thermal hazard that was posed by the heat flux. The authors also
noted that stationary temperatures located in training buildings offered only a rough
approximation of the thermal hazard to the firefighters working in those buildings.
René Rossi [21] conducted a series of experiments in firefighter training build-
ings in Switzerland in order to examine the effect of different thermal exposures on
core temperature and sweat production. Heat flux and temperature measurements
were taken in the training buildings. Rather severe peak thermal conditions were
observed during the tests, noting temperatures as high as 278◦C and 26 kW/m2.
More routine exposures were between 50◦C and 130◦C and 5 and 10 kW/m2. The
results indicated that relatively high heat fluxes were observed for rather moderate
temperatures.
Thus, while a number of studies have examined the thermal hazards that fire-
fighter students and instructors are exposed to in the training fire environment,
there is a gap in the literature regarding the fidelity of these training fires, that is,
the degree of exactness that the training fires adhere to a fire that may be encoun-
tered on the modern fireground. Additionally, little research has focused on new
training fuels, such as OSB, particleboard, and other engineered wood products,
that many training academies and organizations have begun to incorporate into fire
service training. This study will attempt to bridge the gap in understanding be-
tween training fuels and fuels representative of those found in residential structures.
Additionally, the relative thermal hazards of these fuels will be compared, in an
effort to place into context the relative severity of these fuels.
Safety is a critical concern for live fire training scenarios. It is imperative
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that safety is not compromised in the pursuit of creating fire dynamics consistent
with a realistic residential fire with modern fuels. This means the minimization of
training-related injuries and deaths from excessive thermal exposure. Additionally,
thermal conditions in which equipment, such as facepieces, helmets, and electronic
equipment, may be damaged are undesirable, as the replacement of such equipment
can unnecessarily burden a fire department.
Training fires are different from typical fires that the fire department may
respond to in the respect that firefighters involved in suppression and search and
rescue operations are not the only personnel inside the burn structure. Rather,
support personnel such as instructors and stokers are actively involved in the training
scenarios as well. Stokers are firefighters whose specific task is the construction and
maintenance of fuel packages throughout the training evolution. In contrast to a
residential fire, where the suppression team would likely be mitigating conditions
with a hose line before entering the areas of the most severe thermal conditions,
these instructors and stokers are often tasked with maintaining the fire, and may
be positioned in or close to the fire room, possibly for extended periods of time.
Thus, the threat that the thermal conditions in these areas pose to firefighters must
be considered. Additionally, it is important that recruits understand that although
such areas are relatively safe for habitation in the training environment, the same
areas in a real fire may quickly result in death or serious injury.
A variety of methods exist for evaluating the thermal conditions to which fire-
fighters are exposed. In general, they divide the thermal environment into either
three or four classes, with the lowest class representing conditions only slightly more
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severe than ambient, and the highest class representing emergency conditions, ten-
able for only a few seconds before equipment failure, injury, or death are imminent.
Some of these methods, such as the NIST Thermal Classes proposed by Donnelly et
al. [22] are used primarily for the purpose of evaluating electronic equipment used
by firefighters. The NIST thermal classes specify 4 classes, which are presented in
Table 2.1. Since these thermal classes are focused specifically on electronic equip-
ment, PASS alarms in particular, they are not the most appropriate for evaluating
the risk of thermal injury to firefighters in training fires. Additionally, heat flux and
temperature are treated separately in the NIST thermal classes, so the consideration
of only one value may give an incomplete picture of the thermal threat.
Table 2.1: NIST Thermal Classes
Thermal Class Maximum Time (min) Maximum Temperature (◦C) Maximum Heat Flux (kW/m2)
I 25 100 1
II 15 160 2
III 5 260 10
IV ≤1 ≥260 ≥10
A more appropriate method of characterizing the thermal environment is the
thermal operating conditions outlined by Utech [23]. Utech uses the temperature
at the firefighter’s height as an approximation of the convective heat transfer to the
firefighter’s gear and the incident heat flux as an approximation of the radiative
heat transfer to the firefighter’s gear from the surfaces of the room, the upper gas
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layer, and the fire itself. He combines these two quantities to define three fields of
thermal conditions: Routine, Ordinary, and Emergency. According to Utech, rou-
tine conditions are defined as those where the surrounding temperature is between
20◦C and 70◦C with an incident heat flux between 1 and 2 kW/m2. He maintains
that these conditions translate approximately to ambient conditions, not necessarily
requiring any thermal protection. As the heat flux and surrounding temperature
both increase, the thermal environment crosses into the ordinary operating range.
This ordinary range is defined between 70 and 200◦C and between 2 and 12 kW/m2.
Ordinary operating conditions represent more serious fire conditions, such as those
next to a flashed over room. According to Utech, firefighters would be able to func-
tion under ordinary operating conditions from 10-20 minutes at a time, or in other
words for the working duration of an SCBA cylinder. Utech considers ordinary op-
erating conditions those that were typical of a house fire. The final classification is
emergency operating conditions, which are those thermal conditions exceeding 12
kW/m2 and 200◦C. These operating conditions are intended to be consistent with
an environment dangerous to a firefighter in PPE, such as a firefighter trapped in a
room that is flashing over. Utech describes this zone as one in which a firefighter’s
PPE would only be able to withstand an exposure on the order of a few seconds
in the emergency operating range. Figure 2.1 offers a visual chart of the thermal
operating classes, where the x-axis is heat flux, plotted on a logarithmic scale, in
kW/m2, and the y-axis is temperature, also plotted on a logarithmic scale, in ◦C.
Rather than representing the threat to electronic equipment, as the NIST ther-
mal classes are intended to do, Utech’s thermal operating classes estimate the po-
17

























Figure 2.1: Utech’s Thermal Exposure Conditions
tential for thermal injury to a firefighter. Utech defined the three operating classes
using the results of experiments that had been conducted on contemporary fire-
fighter PPE. The state of the art in firefighter protective equipment has improved
significantly since 1973. Modern turnout gear features full encapsulation, with a
battery of standard tests which establish minimum performance criteria [24, 25].
Mensch et al. [26] conducted an investigation to quantify the performance of fire-
fighter SCBA facepiece lens under radiant heat flux. The study indicated that
the mean temperature of crack formation (180◦C) and hole formation (270◦C) ap-
proximately corresponded to the glass transition temperature and melting point,
respectively, of polycarbonate. Further, hole formation was noted at heat fluxes as
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low as 8 kW/m2. As the incident heat flux was increased, the time to hole formation
decreased. Figure 2.2 shows these benchmarks, as well as the 80 kW/m2 heat flux
that protective ensembles are exposed to during the thermal performance test [24],
superimposed on Utech’s thermal classes.
Comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that the temperature threshold be-
tween the ordinary and emergency operating classes approximately is between the
temperature that would cause cracking and the temperature that would cause holes
to form in SCBA facepieces. Similarly, the threshold between these two operating
classes falls between 8 and 15 kW/m2, which is the range in which hole forma-
tion would occur to an SCBA facepiece in several minutes. Thus, the thresholds
in Utech’s operating classes are representative of thermal conditions which would
precipitate the failure of firefighters’ PPE. In Utech’s chart, there are several areas,
such as the areas above and to the right of the ordinary operating class, which do
not explicitly fall into any of the three thermal classes. These gaps in the expo-
sure chart are a limitation of Utech’s method because, although they do not have
a specific hazard classification, such exposures can be hazardous if they exceed the






Figure 2.2: Modern PPE Performance Comparison with Utech Thermal Classes
A 72◦C (Temperature at which skin is instantly destroyed [27])
B 180◦C (Mean temperature of hole formation in SCBA facepiece lens [26])
C 270◦C (Mean temperature of crack formation in SCBA facepiece lens [26])
D 8 kW/m2 (Minimum heat flux exposure where lens failure was noted in
less than 20 minutes [26])
E 15 kW/m2 (SCBA facepiece lens failure occurs between 1.5 and
4 minutes [26])
F 80 kW/m2 (Heat flux which PPE ensemble is exposed to during Thermal
Performance Test (TPP) [24])
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Chapter 3: Experimental Approach
This chapter will describe the fuel loads and ventilation configurations that
were used in the four heat release rate experiments and the eight concrete burn
building experiments. Additionally, the burn structure that was used for the con-
crete burn building experiments is detailed, and the instruments that were used to
conduct each of the tests will be specified.
3.1 Structure
The concrete training building that was used for these experiments was located
at the Delaware County Emergency Services Training Center in Sharon Hill, PA.
The three-story structure has a footprint of 33.5 ft. x 28 ft, and is shown in Figure
3.1. All of the fires were ignited on the second floor in the designated burn room,
labeled Room 201, which was located in the southwest corner of the burn building.
Three other rooms on the second floor of the building, labeled 202, 203, and 204,
were also instrumented. The remaining 2 rooms on the second floor was sealed from
the rest of the space by a cement board barrier, and was used to stage and store
fuel. Room 201 had 96 in. ceilings, and measured 224 in. x 152 in. Rooms 202,
203, and 204 had 133 in. ceilings. Room 202 measured 129 in. x 206 in., Room
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203 measured 99 in. x 206 in., and Room 204 measured 131 in. x 175 in. The floor
plan for the second floor of the training building is shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2
additionally lists the doorways and windows in the burn structure. The dimensions
of these openings are given in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Concrete Burn Structure
22
Figure 3.2: Second Floor Layout
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Table 3.1: Door and Window Dimensions












As Figure 3.2 shows, the second floor is connected to the first and third floors
by an interior staircase and an exterior fire escape. The door between Room 204 and
the fire escape was not opened in any of these tests, but the exterior door at the base
of the staircase was used in the remote ventilation configuration. Other ventilation
openings included the windows in Rooms 201, 202, 203, and 204. Room 201 had
two of these windows, although only one of these windows was opened during any
of the experiments. Additionally, several of the room featured scuppers, which are
built-in openings along the floor of the rooms which are used to facilitate drainage
and cleanup following a training evolution. An example of one of these scuppers is
shown in Figure 3.3. Four such scuppers were on the second floor of the building.
Room 204 had a scupper that measured 16.5 inches long by 8 inches high. Rooms
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201, 202, and 203 each had a square 8 inch by 8 inch scupper. On the ground floor,
there was a four circular scuppers which were 5 inches in diameter.
Figure 3.3: Scupper
3.2 Fuel Packages
Three fuel packages were chosen for the concrete burn building experiments.
Two of these fuel loads, the pallets and straw package and the pallets, straw, and
OSB package were chosen to be representative of training fuels that are commonly
used in the fire service. The third fuel load included sofas, chairs, coffee tables, and
end tables, all of which are common furnishings that would be found in a modern
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home. The intent was to compare the fire dynamics produced as a result of the two
training fires to those observed in the furnished room fire. Additionally, the fire
dynamics of the furnished room fire can be compared to fire dynamics research that
previously has been conducted in residential structures.
3.2.1 Pallets and Straw
Wooden pallets and straw are fuels that are widely used training fuels in the
United States. They are appealing to use for live-fire training because of their low
cost, high availability, and relative predictability when it comes to fire dynamics.
In addition, the ease of ignition and quick cleanup facilitate quick turnover between
evolutions, a quality that is quite important to fire instructors aiming to maximize
the amount of live fire evolutions possible during a class.
In an effort to ensure that the pallets used as fuel in these experiments were
uniform, they were purchased from the same lot. The pallets were weighed in each
experiment except for Experiment 3. The total list of pallet weights can be found
in Appendix A. The pallets had an average weight of 18.2±1.5 kg. Three such
pallets and one bale of straw were used for each test. The average weight of the
straw was 14.3±0.5 kg. The total weight of the pallets used in the pallets and straw
experiments was 54.8±2.1 kg.The pallets were oriented in a pyramid configuration
on top of a steel stand. The steel stand, shown in Figure 3.5, consisted of four steel
legs supporting a frame, across which was laid a flattened, perforated steel sheet,
which allowed air entrainment into the bottom of the pallet assembly. The bulk of
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the straw was used to fill the center of the pallet pyramid, and the remainder of
the bale was placed beneath the stand and into the slats of the pallets. The entire
assembly is shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Pallets and Straw Fuel Package
3.2.2 Pallets, Straw, and OSB
Oriented Strand Board (OSB) is a type of engineered lumber composed of
small wood chips pressed together and bonded with some type of resin. Some fire
academies and fire training organizations have begun to incorporate OSB, as well
as other types of engineered lumber into their live fire training burns. OSB has
been identified as having a higher heat release rate than pure wood products, and
27
Figure 3.5: Training Fuel Stand
therefore has attracted some fire service trainers hoping to create more realistic
training environments. In some training evolutions, the OSB is the only fuel that is
used, while in others it is used in conjunction with conventional wood-based training
fuels, such as pallets and straw. In the OSB tests in this series of experiments, the
latter case was studied.
For ease of description, the experiments using pallets, straw, and OSB as a
fuel will be referenced simply as “OSB” experiments. The pallets were the same
as those used in the pallets and straw experiments. Three pallets with a average
weight of 18.2±1.5 kg and one bale of straw were used for each experiment. The
total list of pallet weights can be found in Appendix AThe average weight of the
straw was 14.3±0.5 kg. The OSB sheets were 7/16 in. thick 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheets. The
OSB sheets were weighed together, with a total weight of 42.2 kg. the approximate
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total weight of the pallets, straw, and OSB fuel package is 155.7 kg. The pallets and
straw were configured in an identical way to that described in the previous section.
The OSB sheets were placed behind the pallet pyramid, along the rear wall of the
fire room. The pallets, straw, and OSB assembly is depicted Figure 3.6
Figure 3.6: Pallets, Straw, and OSB Fuel Package
3.2.3 Furniture
The furnished room fire consisted of two couches, two chairs, two end tables,
two lamps, a coffee table, carpet, and carpet padding. The furniture was selected to
simulate the living room of a modern home. The couches and chairs were purchased
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from a retailer and were assembled prior to the experiments. The upholstery was
primarily polyurethane foam and the frame of the couches was wooden. The chairs
had a polyurethane foam cushion and an expanded polystyrene frame. The end
table and coffee table were made of pressboard. The weights of each of the respective
pieces of the fuel package are given in Figure 3.2. The combined weight of the The
layout of the furnished room is shown in Figure 3.7. furnished room fuel package is
approximately 210.5 kg.
Figure 3.7: Furniture Layout
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Table 3.2: Furnished Room Contents
Furniture Item Quantity Weight (kg)
Couch 2 46.0
Chair 2 7.6
End Table 2 15.4
Coffee Table 2 20.6
Carpet 1 15.8
Carpet Padding 1 10.9
Lamp 2 2.3
3.3 HRR Characterization Tests
To evaluate the heat release rate characteristics of each of the fuel packages de-
scribed above, a series of tests were performed in UL’s oxygen consumption calorime-
try laboratory. Each fuel package was arranged in a manner identical to the config-
uration in the concrete burns structure, but instead of the concrete burn room, a
144 inch x 144 inch compartment was constructed. The compartment was framed
with dimensional lumber and had an interior finish of gypsum board. The room has
a 96 inch wide x 80 inch tall doorway, which was chosen to provide ample venti-
lation to the compartment. Since this ventilation configuration was different than
that in the concrete burn building experiment, the heat release rates should be used
only to compare the fuels to each other for a similar ventilation opening and room
configuration, rather than extrapolating the results to the concrete burn building
experiments.
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The oxygen consumption calorimeter used for these experiments was located
at Underwriters’ Laboratories facility in Northbrook, IL. Four heat release rate
experiments were performed. One experiment each was performed for the pallets
and straw and the OSB fuel packages, and two replicates of the furnished rooms were
performed. This was done to characterize the variability of the furnished room fuel
package. The calorimeter reported heat release rate in MW at 1 second intervals
for the heat release rate experiments. Bryant and Mullholland [28] estimate the
uncertainty of oxygen consumption calorimeters measuring high heat release rate
fires at ±11%. They identify several sources of error within hte calorimeter, but one
of the primary sources is the uncertainty in the gas concentration measurements.
3.3.1 Heat Release Rate Characterization Results
The results of the heat release rate characterization experiments are summa-
rized in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 and Table 3.3. The total energy released was determined
by numerically integrating the total heat release rate curve using an Euler scheme,
described in Equation 3.1. A 25 second moving average was applied to each of the
heat release rate graphs to minimize some of the fluctuations in the raw data.
En+1 = En + ∆T ∗HRRn (3.1)
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Figure 3.8: Heat Release Rate vs. Time for Heat Release Rate Characterization Exper-
iments.
Table 3.3: Peak HRR and Total Energy Released
Fuel Package Peak Heat Release Rate (MW) Total Energy Released (GJ)
Pallets and Straw 2.88 0.95
OSB 3.63 1.44
Furnished Room 1 8.50 1.79
Furnished Room 2 7.52 2.19
The heat release rate of the pallets and straw first began to increase at ap-
proximately 50 seconds from the start of the test, and the rate of change of the HRR
remained positive until approximately 325 seconds after ignition. The peak slope of
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Figure 3.9: Total Energy Released vs. Time for Heat Release Rate Characterization
Experiments.
the heat release curve was noted in the period immediately following ignition, where
the rate of change of heat release rate was 30 kW/s.
The rate at which the HRR increased in the period leading up to the peak
HRR was similar for the OSB fuel package, with a peak slope of approximately 30
kW/s. The heat release rate observed in the OSB fuel package was 26% higher
than that noted in the pallets and straw experiment. Perhaps a more singificant
difference however, can be seen in Figure 3.9. This figure illustrates that the total
energy released by the OSB fuel package is 52% greater than that released by the
pallets and straw fuel package. This trend is also manifested in Figure 3.8. In the
OSB fuel package, after the peak heat release rate is observed, the heat release rate
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remains above 3 MW for another 150 seconds before beginning to decrease. In the
pallets and straw, on the other hand, the heat release rate began to decrease almost
immediately. So, while the peak rate of growth that was observed in the two training
fuel packages was similar, the OSB exhibited a higher peak heat release rate. The
sustained period of high heat release also resulted in a greater total energy released
than the pallets and straw fuel package.
Two replicates of the furnished room fuel packages were performed, each one
with identical furnishings and layout. In both tests, the HRR did not begin to
increase significantly until after 200 seconds from the beginning of the test. Once
this point was reached, however, the rate of increase of the heat release rate was
above 150 kW/s, which was approximately 5 times that noted in the training fuels.
Both furnished rooms reached their peak heat release rate close to 325 seconds. The
peak heat release rate in Furnished Room 1 was 8.50 MW, which was 13% higher
than the 7.52 MW peak observed in the second furnished room. After reaching this
peak, the heat release rate remained high, which resulted in total energy releases
that were higher than both training fuels. The heat release rate rapidly declined
after this period. In Furnished Room 1 heat release rates greater than 5.5 MW were
observed for approximately 300 seconds. In the second furnished room, heat release
rates above 5.5 MW were observed for approximately 400 seconds.
The peak heat release rates between the two furnished room replicates varied
by between 11.5% and 13.0%, which is slightly greater than the combined uncer-
tainty of the calorimeter. The difference between total energy released between the
two replicates was more significant, with the difference falling between 18% and
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22%. This difference can be explained in part by the longer period of sustained heat
release rates in the second replicate of the furnished room. This longer period of
sustained heat release could because more of the fuel burned in the second replicate
than the first, or possibly because of the difference in peak heat release rate be-
havior between the two, or some combination of both factors. Thus, in addition to
exhibiting higher peak heat release rates and total energies released than the OSB
or pallets and straw training fuels, the furnished rooms demonstrated a peak rate
of change in heat release rate that was nearly 5 times higher than that noted in the
training fuels.
3.4 Experiments
A total of eight experiments were conducted. Each experiment combined one of
the fuel packages described in the previous section with a ventilation configuration,
in an effort to explore the effects of these ventilation configurations on the behavior
of the training fire. The three configurations were burnout, remote vent, and near
vent. In the burnout case, no doors or windows were opened for the duration of the
test. This was done in an effort to examine the fuels without the outside influence
of ventilation. In the far vent case, the door on the ground floor was opened in
conjunction with the window in Room 204. This was intended to examine the effect
of a ventilation point far from the seat of the fire, creating a flow path where the
inlet was the front door and the exhaust was the far window. The two vent points
for this configuration are shown in Figure 3.10. The near vent case was intended
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to examine the effect of ventilation close to the fire. In this case, the Room 201
window was opened, shown in Figure 3.11.
(a) Front Door (b) Room 204 Window
Figure 3.10: Far Ventilation Case
Table 3.4 lists the experiments that were performed, the fuel package, the ven-
tilation configuration, and the time at which ventilation was performed. Ventilation
times were determined by monitoring the oxygen concentrations at the 2 foot and 6
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Figure 3.11: Near Ventilation Case
foot levels, and performing ventilation when the concentrations reached a minimum
value. It should be noted that a no ventilation experiment was not performed for
the OSB fuel package. This was done because of the time constraints that were
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required for this test series, which were not conducive to an additional experiment.
While a no ventilation case for the OSB fuel package would indeed be useful, it was
assumed that the fire dynamics of the OSB would be bounded by the pallets and
straw and the furniture.
Table 3.4: Experiment Matrix
Experiment Fuel Vent Scenario Vent Time (s)
Experiment 1 Furniture Near Vent 420
Experiment 2 Furniture No Vent -
Experiment 3 Pallets and Straw Remote Vent 239
Experiment 4 OSB Remote Vent 299
Experiment 5 Furniture Remote Vent 511
Experiment 6 Pallets and Straw No Vent -
Experiment 7 Pallets and Straw Near Vent 480
Experiment 8 OSB Near Vent 247
3.5 Instrumentation
This section detailes the equipment that was used in the concrete training
building experiments. These instruments were used to monitor the temperatures,
heat fluxes, gas velocities, and oxygen concentrations throughout the structure. The
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Figure 3.12: Instrument Locations
3.5.1 Thermocouple
The thermocouples used in these experiments were chromel-alumel, Type K
thermocouples, The thermocouple wire was manufactured by Omega Engineering,
and has a nominal 0.5 mm diameter. The individual thermocouple wires were ar-
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ranged into “trees,” which spaced thermocouples at 1 foot increments from the floor
to the ceiling of each rooms. In Room 201, the trees had 7 thermocouples and in
Rooms 202, 203, and 204, the trees had 12 thermocouples. The locations of these
thermocouple trees are denoted by green triangles in Figure 3.12
According to Omega, the uncertainty of the thermocouple wire is 2.2◦C for
temperatures below 293◦C and .75% for temperatures above this range [29] In addi-
tion to the built-in uncertainty of the sensor, radiative effects to the thermocouple
should be considered. Several studies have studied these effects on thermocouple
measurement uncertainty in compartment fires [30,31]. These studies indicated that
when the thermocouple is located in the upper gas layer, the temperature of the sur-
rounding gas is typically higher than the measured reading, although this difference
is not as pronounced as when the thermocouple is in the lower layer. When the
thermocouple is in the lower layer, particularly when the thermocouple is in a fully
involved room fire, the percent error in measured temperature can be much larger.
Because of these radiative contributions, the expanded uncertainty is estimated as
15%.
3.5.2 Heat Flux Gauge
Heat flux was measured using a nominal 2.54 cm diameter, water-cooled,
Schmidt-Boelter heat flux gauge. These gauges were mounted in metal ammunition
cans, which were also water cooled and insulated. These protective cans allowed
the heat flux gauges to be placed close to the fire room without being damaged
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or destroyed. The heat flux gauges were oriented towards the ceiling in an effort
to evaluate the heat flux from the hot gas layer in the room. It should be noted
that these gauges are total heat flux gauges, and therefore capture both convective
and radiative heat transfer. The radiative heat transfer is largely a function of the
temperature of the hot gas layer, while the convective heat transfer is dependent
both on the ambient temperature and the velocity of the gas flow. The locations of
the heat flux gauges are shown by yellow squares in Figure 3.12.
The manufacturer of these heat flux gauges lists the uncertainty as 3%. Each
gauge has a unique calibration curve, which converts the voltage signal into a heat
flux. Such gauges are NIST-traceable, and must be re-calibrated from time to time
to ensure accuracy. A study on the uncertainty of measurements for heat flux gauges
lists the maximum uncertainty for these instruments as 8% [32].
3.5.3 Bidirectional Velocity Probes
Gas velocity measurements were conducted using a differential pressure trans-
ducer coupled with a thermocouple measurement. The differential pressure mea-
surement was conducted using a stainless steel probe, the two ends of which were
connected to a Setra Model 264 differential pressure transducer with a 1.0 inch water
column (248.8 Pa) range. Five of these probes constituted each array. The arrays
were located in the window to Room 201, the doorway between Rooms 201 and 202,
the stairwell doorway, and the window in Room 204. In each case, the array was
centered laterally in the door. The vertical probe spacings for each of the arrays are
42
listed in Table 3.5. The thermocouple was a 0.62 inch type KSL iconel 600 sheathed
ground junction thermocouple with a 24 gauge Type K lead. The locations of the
bidirectional probe arrays are shown by red squares in Figure 3.12. The expanded
uncertainty of the bidirectional probe velocity measurements is 5% [33].
Table 3.5: Bidirectional Probe Spacings
Array Location Probe Spacings (inches)
1BDP Room 201 Window 6.75, 13.5, 20.25, 27, 33.75 (from bottom ledge)
2BDP Room 201/202 Door 13, 26, 39, 52, 65 (from floor)
3BDP Stairwell Door 14, 28, 42, 56, 70 (from floor)
4BDP Room 204 Window 8.5, 17, 25.5, 34, 42.5 (from bottom ledge)
3.5.4 Gas Analyzers
Gas samples were collected at heights of 2 feet and 6 feet from the floor in
two locations in Room 201, shown by blue circles in Figure 3.12. The samples
were collected by stainless steel tubes, which were run into the fire room. The
samples were first passed through a coarse paper filter (Solberg Model 8242) before
being passed through a condensing trap to remove moisture. The samples then ran
through a nominal 0.75 CFM pump (Cole Palmer Model L-79200-30), and from
there through a drying tube (Perma Pure Model FF-250-SG-2.5G) and a fine filter
(FF-250-E-2.5G) before finally running to the OxyMat6 Siemens Gas Analyzers.
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The range for the oxygen measurements in the OxyMat6 are from 0-25%. The
listed measurement uncertainty under ambient conditions for this operating range
is 0.32% by volume. This uncertainty would be expected to further increase under
fire conditions, as evaluated by Axelsson et al. in a study aiming to quantify the
uncertainty in the oxygen concentration measurement during oxygen consumption
calorimetry tests [34]. The results of the uncertainty analysis indicated that the
combined uncertainty of the oxygen concentrations measurement at 18% oxygen,
measured curing an approximately 1 MW fire test, was 0.65%.
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Chapter 4: Experimental Results
This chapter presents the measurements from the concrete burn building ex-
periments described in the previous chapter. Because of time constraints, several
experiments had to be conducted in the same day. The experiments were planned so
that the experiments in which the most severe thermal conditions were anticipated
were conducted at the end of the day. Table 4.1 lists the intial temperatures, taken
as an average across the height of the fire room, the order in which the test was
conducted that day, the time since the previous test, and the ambient temperature.
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Table 4.1: Initial Temperatures
Experiment Test of day Time Since Average Initial Ambient
Previous Test Temperature ◦C Temperature
(hours) ◦C ◦C
Experiment 1 4 3 42±4 32
Experiment 2 2 3 32±4 33
Experiment 3 3 2 39±4 29
Experiment 4 1 - 33±1 33
Experiment 5 2 6 34±3 29
Experiment 6 1 - 32±1 32
Experiment 7 2 2 40±4 34
Experiment 8 3 2 43±5 36
Table 4.1 shows that tests that were conducted later in the day showed a higher
initial temperature and a higher standard deviation from the average than test which
were conducted in the morning. This can be attributed to the nature of the concrete
burn building, which has a tendency to hold heat after training evolutions. Since
at least two hours were allowed between experiments, these temperature differences
are only on the order of a few degrees with a maximum difference of 7◦C between
the start and end of a testing day. Thus, it is not expected that the changes
had a substantial effect on the experimental results, although previous studies have
emphasized the importance of alotting for sufficient time between evolutions [18].
One of the considerations of this study is the effect that ventilation, or the ab-
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sence of ventilation, has on fire behavior, the oxygen measurements in the fire room
are first presented for each of the experiments. Then, the heat flux and temperature
results are presented for each of the three fuel packages. The 7 foot temperature
measurements used to characterize the response to fire, as the temperature at this
level would be the first to respond to changes in fire growth. The 3 foot temperature
measurements are presented to represent the temperature that a crawling firefighter
would be exposed. The results focus on the measurements that were conducted in
the fire room. Peak heat fluxes and temperatures in the remote rooms are presented
in the Appendix A.
4.1 Room 201 Oxygen Concentrations
The oxygen concentration was measured in 4 locations, each of them in the
fire room. Two separate two-sensor arrays, one located at the door between Room
201 and Room 202, and the other located in the corner on the opposite wall, each
had sensors at 2 ft. and 6 ft. from the floor. The intent of the different heights
is to offer an approximation of the oxygen concentration within the thermal layer
itself (6 ft.) and at a lower elevation in the room, where fresh air has the ability
to be entrained. The oxygen concentrations can be considered in two time frames:
pre-ventilation and post-ventilation. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the oxygen
concentration profiles with respect to time for the pallets and straw experiments,
the OSB experiments, and the furniture experiments, respectively. In these plots,
the black dots represent the point at which ventilation was performed. The solid
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lines represent the pre-ventilation period and the dotted lines represent the post-
ventilation period.
4.1.1 Pallets and Straw Oxygen Concentrations






























(a) Rear 6 ft.
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(d) Doorway 2 ft.
Figure 4.1: Oxygen Concentration in Room 201 for Pallets and Straw Experiments.
Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black
dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as
the corresponding solid line.
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Table 4.2: Room 201 6 ft. O2 Concentrations for Pallets and Straw Experiments
Experiment
Minimum Pre-Vent O2 % O2 % at Ventilation
Rear Doorway Rear Doorway
3 (Remote Vent) 10.7 9.8 10.7 9.8
6 (No Vent) 9.0 9.2 - -
7 (Near Vent) 13.3 10.6 13.5 11.8
In Experiments 3, 6, and 7, as the fire developed, the oxygen concentrations
at the 6 ft. level decreased, as seen in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b. In Experiment 3, the
remote ventilation case, the oxygen concentration decreased to between 9 and 10 %,
at which point the door and Room 204 window were ventilated. At this point, the
O2 concentration measured at the doorway gas analyzer is approximately constant
at 9.8%. The sensor in the rear of the room measures 10.71%, and is continuing to
decrease. Both of these trends continue for a brief period of time after ventilation,
before starting to increase. By the end of the experiment, the O2 concentration at
the 6 ft. level was above 17.5% in both the doorway and the rear of the room. The
minimum 6 ft. oxygen concentrations and the 6 ft. concentrations at the time of
ventilation for Experiment 3, as well as the rest of the pallets and straw experiments,
are listed in Table 4.2.
A similar trend was noted in Experiment 7. The rate of decrease of oxygen
concentration was slower in this test than in Experiment 7, only reaching 10.6 % at
the doorway and 13.3 % in the rear of the fire room before reaching a steady state
and briefly starting to increase, at which point ventilation was initiated. In contrast
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to Experiment 3, the oxygen concentrations reached their minimum level prior to
ventilation in Experiment 7. The 6 ft. oxygen concentrations began to increase
more quickly than was noted in Experiment 3, increasing from 13.5% to 18.2% in
the rear of the room and from 11.6% to 13.5% by the end of the test.
In the no ventilation case, Experiment 6, the oxygen concentration decreased
at a rate similar to Experiment 3. It reached a minimum concentration close to
9%, before beginning to increase. The rate of increase in oxygen concentration was
rapid at first, eventually decreasing and reaching a steady state near 18.6% in the
rear and 19.1% in the doorway. Thus, in the pallets and straw experiments, the
initial growth of the fire and development of a thermal layer resulted in a decrease
in oxygen concentrations.
In each of the experiments, this oxygen concentration returned to concentra-
tions close to 18% by the end of the test, regardless of whether ventilation was per-
formed. The decreased oxygen profile indicates an increase in combustion products,
such as soot, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide, in the thermal layer during fire
growth, and that, as the growth rate decreased, the concentration of oxygen began
to increase as the smoke and other gases was exhausted from the structure, whether
through ventilation openings such as windows or doors, or through openings in the
building itself, such as scuppers or gaps.
The marked decrease in oxygen concentration that was observed at the 6 ft.
level was not noticed in the 2 ft. gas analyzer locations. Figures 4.1c and 4.1d show
the 2 ft. oxygen concentration profiles for Experiments 3, 6, and 7. Inspection of the
plots reveals that the oxygen concentrations at the 2 ft. level do not fall below 20%
50
for the entire duration of the test. While the oxygen concentrations do decrease, it is
not nearly on the same order of magnitude as the decrease noted at the 6 ft. sensors.
This indicates that two distinct zones exist in the pallets and straw experiments:
a layer close to the floor that is mostly comprised of air being entrained into the
structure, and a hot gas layer that is oxygen deficient. The presence of these two
distinct layers indicates that the rate of combustion of smoke and other combustion
products is less than the rate at which these products of combustion are exhausted
through leakage in the structure.
Comparison of the oxygen concentrations, particularly at the 6 foot level,
between Experiments 3 and 6, which were the remote ventilation and no ventilation
cases, respectively, reveals that the rate of oxygen depletion and subsequent recovery
followed a similar trend, despite the ventilation that occurred in Experiment 3. This,
coupled with the negligible change in oxygen concentrations at the 2 foot level in each
of the three experiments, would indicate that ventialtion did not have a significant
impact on the growth of the pallets and straw fires.
4.1.2 OSB Oxygen Concentrations
The experiments using OSB as a fuel, Experiments 4 and 8, displayed quite
similar pre-ventilation 6 ft. oxygen depletion following ignition. The 6 ft. oxygen
concentrations began to decline shortly after, reaching minimum values below 7.4%,
as listed in Table 4.3. In both of the experiments, the oxygen concentrations began
to increase following this minimum value. After ventilation, there was a brief period
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(d) Doorway 2 ft.
Figure 4.2: Oxygen Concentration in Room 201 for OSB Experiments. Solid lines rep-
resents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-
ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corre-
sponding solid line.
where the oxygen concentration remained approximately constant, before the 6 ft.
oxygen concentrations began to rebound, reaching values above 16% by the end of
the test period. The minimum values observed in Experiments 4 and 8 were lower
than the minimum values noted in the pallets and straw training fire experiments.
These minimum values occurred within the same 100 second time frame as the min-
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Table 4.3: Room 201 6 ft. O2 Concentrations for OSB Experiments
Experiment
Minimum Pre-Vent O2 % O2 % at Ventilation
Rear Doorway Rear Doorway
4 (Remote Vent) 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.4
8 (Near Vent) 7.3 7.0 7.7 8.4
imum values in Experiments 3 and 6, while the pallets and straw fire in Experiment
7 took considerably longer to reach a minimum value.
The trend in 2 ft. oxygen concentrations for the OSB experiments was similar
to the pattern in the pallets and straw tests, staying above 20% for the duration
of the experiment. Just as in the pallets and straw tests, this indicates that two
distinct layers exist in the fire room: a fresh air layer close to the floor, where oxy-
gen concentrations remain close to ambient levels, and an oxygen deficient gas layer
close to the ceiling. In the absence of additional ventilation, the leakage through
the concrete building is sufficient to maintain these close-to-ambient oxygen concen-
trations in the lower layer, while the upper layer remains oxygen-deficient. When
additional ventilation is provided, the fire is not producing combustion products at
a rate that is sufficiently high to overcome the ventilation openings, and the oxygen
concentration in the upper layer increases.
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(d) Doorway 2 ft.
Figure 4.3: Oxygen Concentration in Room 201 for Furnished Room Experiments. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.
Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the
corresponding solid line.
4.1.3 Furnished Room Oxygen Concentrations
The most profound changes in ventilation were noted in the furnished room
experiments (1, 2, and 5). The oxygen concentration profiles for these tests are
shown in Figure 4.3. The oxygen concentrations remain close to ambient levels for
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Table 4.4: Room 201 6 ft. O2 Concentrations for Furnished Room Experiments
Experiment
Minimum Pre-Vent O2 % O2 % at Ventilation
Rear Doorway Rear Doorway
1 (Near Vent) 9.9 7.8 12.0 10.0
2 (No Vent) 5.2 5.4 - -
5 (Remote Vent) 9.4 8.1 11.3 10.1
Table 4.5: Room 201 2 ft. O2 Concentrations for Furnished Room Experiments
Experiment
Minimum Pre-Vent O2 % O2 % at Ventilation
Rear Doorway Rear Doorway
1 (Near Vent) 14.3 18.1 14.4 18.5
2 (No Vent) 5.4 13.1 - -
5 (Remote Vent) 10.8 18.4 13.8 18.6
a longer period of time than in the training fire tests, a trend which is consistent
with the delayed growth observed in the HRR experiments. In the no ventilation
test in Experiment 2, the oxygen concentrations at both 6 ft. sample points and the
2 ft. sample point in the rear of the fire room all reached a minimum between 5%
and 5.5%, as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The 2 ft. oxygen concentration in the
doorway was considerably higher, remaining above 13.1% for the duration of the
experiment. The oxygen concentration is likely higher at this location because cold
air is entering the fire room through the lower half of the doorway. A similar trend
was noted in Experiments 1 and 5.
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In Experiment 5, oxygen concentrations declined in a manner similar to Ex-
periment 2. in the gas layer, the concentrations declined to 8.1% in the doorway
and 9.4% in the doorway. In the rear of the room, at the 2 ft. level, the concentra-
tion exhibited a minimum value of 10.8% prior to ventilation. In the doorway, the
oxygen concentration remained higher than 18%. After reaching these minimum
values, the oxygen concentration at each location began to increase, at which point
ventilation was initiated. Oxygen concentrations at each location briefly continued
their increase before declining again, reaching values between 5 and 6% at the 6 ft.
sensors and in the rear of the fire room. The oxygen concentration in the doorway
remained high, only decreasing slightly in the period after ventilation.
The pre-ventilation oxygen concentrations in Experiment 1 followed the same
trend as Experiment 5, although the minimum values were reached at earlier times.
The minimum oxygen concentrations in the gas layer sample points were 7.8 and
9.9%, and the minimum observed concentration in the rear 2 ft. sample point
was 14.3%. As these oxygen concentrations started to increase, ventilation was
initiated, which resulted in a rapid decrease in oxygen concentrations at both 6 ft.
sample points, as well as the 2 ft. sensor in the rear of the fire room. All of these
sensors recorded values between 5 and 6% for the majority of the period following
ventilation. The 2 ft. oxygen concentration remained higher than the other locations
in the post-ventilation period, reaching a minimum of 11.2%, but exhibiting values
above 16% for most of the period.
For the furniture fires, the pre-ventilation behavior involved a decrease in
oxygen concentrations at both 6 ft. locations and at the 2 ft. rear location in
56
the period preceding ventilation. In each of the furnished room experiments, the
oxygen concentrations at each of these locations fell to between 5 and 6%, even in
the non-ventilated case (Experiment 2). This would indicate that in these areas
of the room, combustion would not be possible because of the lack of available
oxygen. This lack of available oxygen was not noted in the 2 ft. doorway sample
location, however. Even in the no ventilation case, where there were no window
or door ventilation openings, the oxygen concentrations measured at this location
were higher than those in the other three locations. This would indicate that the
fire is drawing fresh air into the fire room through natural leakage points within
the training building. In the remote ventilation experiment (Experiment 5), the air
entrained through leakage was supplemented by air entrained through the first floor
door and window. This corresponded with a higher minimum oxygen concentration
than was observed than in the other two furniture experiments. Thus, the furnished
room tests varied considerably from the training fuels in the respect that these rooms
achieved oxygen-deficient conditions close to the floor- a phenomenon that was not
observed in the pallets and straw or OSB fires.
4.2 Thermal Conditions
4.2.1 Pallets and Straw Experiment Thermal Conditions
As discussed in the previous section, the oxygen concentration profiles in the
pallets and straw experiments exhibited negligible depletion at the 2 foot level,
while the behavior of the oxygen concentration with time at the 6 foot level did not
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appear to be impacted by ventilation in either of the experiments where ventilation
was present. The floor heat flux, 3 foot temperature, and 7 foot temperature in
these experiments were similarly unaffected by ventilation. The time histories of
these three values are shown in Figures 4.4, 4.6, and 4.5. Comparison of the rate
of change of these quantities in the periods preceding and following ventilation
indicate that the introduction of additional oxygen into the structure did not have an
appreciable increase in thermal conditions. This would be expected, since the oxygen
concentration at the 2 foot level during the pallets and straw experiments remains
close to ambient conditions for the duration of the experiments. Since oxygen at
this level is not depleted, the introduction of additional oxygen via ventilation would
not be expected to increase combustion. Since the combustion rate would not be
expected to increase, neither would the rate at which heat flux or temperature would
increase. Rather these values would be expected to continue on the same trend as
the pre-ventilation period until the fuel started to be consumed completely. Once
again, this can be particularly seen in the similar behavior between the no vent case,
Experiment 6, and the remote vent case, Experiment 3, which had temperature and
ventilation profiles that were quite similar.
The peak heat fluxes and temperatures for the pallets and straw experiments
occurred in the period following ventilation for the two experiments in which venti-
lation was performed, and near the end of the test for the no ventilation case. These
peaks are listed in Table 4.6. The peak heat fluxes of 7.8 kW/m2 and 7.6 kW/m2
for Experiments 3 and 6, respectively were nearly identical, within the 8% error of
the heat flux gauge. Experiment 7 had a 12.5% lower peak of 6.7 kW/m2. The
58

























Figure 4.4: Room 201 Floor Heat Flux for Pallets and Straw Experiments. Solid lines
represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-
ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corre-
sponding solid line.
Table 4.6: Peak Thermal Conditions for Pallets and Straw Experiments
Experiment Peak Floor Heat Flux Peak 3 Foot Temp. Peak 7 Foot Temp.
(kW/m2) (◦C) (◦C)
3 (Remote Vent) 7.8 165 557
6 (No Vent) 7.6 164 477
7 (Near Vent) 6.7 161 439
difference between this peak and the other two experiments is likely because Exper-
iment 7 took longer to grow than the other two experiments, a fact which can be
seen in Figures 4.4, 4.6, and 4.5. The peak 3 foot temperatures were all well within
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Figure 4.5: Room 201 7 ft. Temperatures for Pallets and Straw Experiments. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.
Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the
corresponding solid line.
the error of the thermocouple wire. The most variation between the peaks in the
three tests was noted was noted at the 7 foot level, where the peak in Experiment
3 was 18% greater than that in Experiment 6, and the peak in Experiment 7 was
7.8% lower than that in Experiment 6. While the difference between Experiments
6 and 7 was within the error of the thermocouple, the peak in Experiment 3 was
slightly above the uncertainty in the wire.
4.2.2 OSB Experiment Thermal Conditions
The oxygen concentrations in the OSB experiments demonstrated a similar
trend to the pallets and straw experiments. Negligible depletion was noted at the
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Figure 4.6: Room 201 3 ft. Temperatures for Pallets and Straw Experiments. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.
Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the
corresponding solid line.
2 foot sample points, but at the 6 foot level, oxygen concentrations decreased until
the point of ventilation, at which point they recovered to levels closer to ambient,
after a brief period of steady behavior. Although the oxygen concentration behavior
between the two training fuels was similar, the thermal conditions noted in the OSB
experiments were more severe. The 7 foot temperature profiles for Experiments 4
and 8 are shown in Figure 4.7. In Experiment 8, the 7 foot temperature increased
22% from 669 ◦C at the time of ventilation to a post-vent peak of 714. WHile this
increase is significant, the slope of the 7 foot temperature curve did not increase in
a significant way. ◦C. A more significant was noted in Experiment 4, the remote
ventilation case, where the temperature at the time of ventilation was 669 ◦C. The
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temperature decreased following ventilation, before rebounding to a post-vent peak
of 683 ◦C). While the temperature changes from the pre- to post-ventilation period
were not particularly notable at the 7 foot level, the floor heat flux and 3 foot
temperature exhibited a more substantial change following ventilation, which can
be seen in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.





















Figure 4.7: Room 201 7 ft. Temperatures for OSB Experiments. Solid lines represents
data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation
data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corresponding solid
line.
The post-ventilation behavior observed in the remote ventilation case (Exp.
4) was similar to the trends noted in the pallets and straw. That is, the rate
at which temperature and heat flux increased did not change in a significant way.
Rather, both values steadily increased until reaching a peak near the end of the test.
While the trend was similar to the pallets and straw, the magnitude of the thermal
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Table 4.7: Room 201 Thermal Peaks in Pre- and Post-Ventilation periods for OSB ex-
periments
Experiment Peak Heat Flux Peak 3 Foot Temperature
(kW/m2) (◦C)
Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent
4 (Remote Vent) 11.1 13.4 158 267
8 (Near Vent) 10.8 19.3 173 305
conditions was higher. The heat flux at the time of ventilation was 11.1 kW/m2,
which increased steadily to a peak value of 13.4 kW/m2 following ventilation, as
listed in Table 4.7. The temperature increased ina similar fashion from 158◦C at
the time of ventilation to a peak 267◦C following ventilation.
The increases following ventilation in Experiment 8, the near ventilation case,
were more pronounced. Immediately following ventilation, the slope of both the 3
foot temperature and floor heat flux curves increase markedly. Further, the increase
in heat flux following ventilation is greater than was noted in the remote ventilation
case, Increasing from 10.8 kW/m2 at the time of ventilation to a peak of 19.3 kW/m2.
The peak value following ventilation was not significantly greater than that noted
in Experiment 4, but this peak was reached sooner after ventilation, because of the
increase in slop of the temperature curve. Thus, while the increased oxygen afforded
by ventilation in Experiment 4 did not impact fire growth, the additional ventilation
provided by opening the fire room window resulted in a marked increase in rate at
which floor heat flux and 3 foot temperatures were increasing, as well as a more
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Figure 4.8: Room 201 Floor Heat Flux for OSB Experiments. Solid lines represents data
prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data
is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corresponding solid line.
severe peak heat flux in the fire room.
4.2.3 Furnished Room Experiment Thermal Conditions
The oxygen concentrations profiles from the three furnished room experiments
showed the greatest amount of depletion, particularly at the 2 foot level. Oxygen
concentrations consistent as low as 11% were noted prior to ventilation, and con-
centrations as low as 5% were seen in the rear of the fire room. This is consistent
with underventilated codnitions, and is in stark contrast to the two distinct zones
noted in the training fuel experiments. These reduced oxygen concentrations were a
function of fuel load and composition, and contributed to the more severe thermal
conditions detailed in this section.
64
























Figure 4.9: Room 201 3 ft. Temperatures for OSB Experiments. Solid lines represents
data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation
data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corresponding solid
line.
Figure 4.10 shows the 7 foot temperatures in the fire room for each of the
furnished room experiments. Inspection of the temperature histories illustrates two
differences between the furnished room 7 foot temperatures adn the traning fuels.
First, the rate of temperature rise close to the ceiling does not drastically increase
until later in the experiment than was noted for the training fuels. This is consistent
with the results of the heat release rate data discussed in Section 3.3.2. Second, the
temperatures at the 7 foot level are higher than those noted in the pallets and
straw or OSB experiments. Table 4.8 shows that the ventilation experiments, the
temperatures were 400◦C and 409◦C at the time of ventilation, increasing to 955◦C
and 726◦C, respectively, for Experiments 1 and 5. In the no ventilation experiment,
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the peak 7 foot temperature was 727◦C, and remained above 600◦C from the 400
second mark until the end of the test.






















Figure 4.10: Room 201 7 ft. Temperatures for Furnished Room Experiments. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.
Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the
corresponding solid line.
In addition to more severe temperatures at the 7 foot level, the heat flux
measured in the fire room during the furnished room experiments was considerably
higher than the fluxes noted in the training fuel tests. Figure 4.11 shows these heat
flux values. Just as was the case with the 7 foot temperatures, a significant rise in
heat flux to the floor was not noted until later in the test than the training fuels.
At the time of ventilation, The ehat flux was 18.4 kW/m2 in the near vent case and
11.1 kW/m2. Following ventilation, the peak heat flux observed in these tests was
150.2 kW/m2 and 69.3 kW/m2, respectively. In the no ventilation case, The heat
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Table 4.8: Room 201 Thermal Peaks in Pre- and Post-Ventilation periods for furniture
experiments
Experiment Peak Heat Flux Peak 3 Foot Temperature Peak 3 Foot Temperature
(kW/m2) (◦C) (◦C)
Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent
1 (Near Vent) 18.4 150.2 408 955 554 924
2 (No Vent) 80.2 - 602 - 747 -
5 (Remote Vent) 11.1 69.1 400 726 561 713
flux climbed steadily to 10 kW/m2, followed by a rapid jump to above 55 kW/m2,
reaching a peak value of 80.2 kW/m2. A similar rapid jump was noted following
ventilation in Experiments 1 and 5. In the near vent case, the increase occurred
almost immediately after ventilation, whereas the increase in the remote vent case
was delayed.
The 3 foot temperatures, shown in Figure 4.12, observed in the furnished rooms
mirrored the severe floor heat flux. Table 4.8 shows that temperatures in excess of
400◦C were noted prior to ventilation for both the remote vent and near vent cases.
After ventilation, temperatures consistent with postflashover conditions were noted.
In the no vent case, the peak temperature close to the floor was 80.24 kW/m2. The
furnished room experiments exhibited considerably more severe thermal conditions
than the pallets and straw or the OSB tests. In addition, the growth in conditions
following ventilation is not only greater, but it occurs more rapidly than in the
training fuel experiments. These differences in thermal conditions and response and
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Figure 4.11: Room 201 Floor Heat Flux for Furnished Room Experiments. Solid lines
represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot. Post-
ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the corre-
sponding solid line.
their effect on firefighting students will be explored in the following section.
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Figure 4.12: Room 201 3 ft. Temperatures for Furnished Room Experiments. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.




This section will use the data presented in the Results section to compare the
fuel loads used for the eight fire experiments. This discussion will be divided into
two parts: one which will consider the fidelity of the training fuels and how they
compare to a “real fire,” and one which will address the safety of the conditions
present in the fires.
5.1 Fidelity
Fidelity can be evaluated in a number of ways. Hartin [35] defines fidelity as,
“the extent to which a simulation reflects reality.” In essence, a live-fire training
evolution is a simulation. The intent of any simulation varies with the objectives
of the particular scenario, but the overall goal is to prepare firefighters for the fires
that they will face in the field. If the simulation is considerably different than the
model, which in this case would be a “real” residential fire, than the simulation may
not be successful in preparing firefighters for challenges that they may face on the
fireground. In the words of Hartin, “Improperly designed training may provide the
learner with an inaccurate perspective of the fire environment which can lead to
disastrous consequences.” In other words, training which inaccurately portrays the
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fire environment, and how the fire environment changes as a result of firefighters’
actions, can allow for the internalization of mistaken concepts, such as “ventilation
always results in the improvement of conditions.”
Hartin suggests that fidelity can be described in two ways, namely, functional
and physical fidelity. Functional fidelity is the extent to which the simulation works
and reacts realistically. In the context of fire dynamics, a training fire with high
functional fidelity would respond similarly to fire department actions such as venti-
lation or suppression when compared to a furnished room fire. Physical fidelity, on
the other hand, would be the extent to which a simulation looks and feels real. A
training fire would exhibit a high degree of physical fidelity would have thermal and
smoke conditions similar to those encountered in a furnished room. Many instruc-
tors focus on physical fidelity: aiming to create a fire that is “bigger and hotter” [14].
By creating a training fire with similar thermal conditions to those experienced on
the actual fireground, however, instructors may be creating a fire environment that
compromises the safety of the students or of the instructors themselves. Rather
than focusing on recreating the severe thermal conditions experienced in real struc-
tures, instructors instead should focus on creating training fires with a high degree
of functional fidelity. By mimicking the response of a furnished room to firefighters’
actions, instructors can properly prepare students for the modern fireground while
still maintaining a degree of safety and control over the fire scenario. The following
sections will consider the two training fuels in terms of their physical fidelity and
function fidelity to the furnished room fire.
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5.1.1 Training Fire Peak Growth Occurs Early in the Fire
Figure 3.8 from Section 3.3.1 showed the heat release rate curves of the three
fuel packages. Recall that the period in which the rate of increase of the HRR was
largest was immediately following ignition. This rapid development in heat release
rate and temperature can be attributed to the pyramid shape of the pallets and
straw setup, which is conducive to fire growth. The fire is ignited in the straw,
which begins to burn readily because of the high surface-area-to-mass ratio. The
fire propagates through the straw in the center of the pyramid quickly, producing
a sufficient amount of heat to ignite the pallets. The pallets make up the majority
of the mass of the fuel, roughly 80%, and are responsible for the bulk of the total
energy that is released. The total energy released by the pallets can be estimated
by using the Equation 5.1, where mfuel is the mass of fuel and ∆Hc is the heat of
combustion. Heats of combustion of 19.2 MJ/kg for white pine and 15.6 MJ/kg
for straw were used [36]. This leads to a theoretical total energy release for each of
the three fuel packages. For the pallets and straw fuel package, the value computed
was 1.26 GJ, 83% of which is attributed to combustion of the pallets. Although
the pallets constitute the majority of the total energy released in the fuel package,
the straw has a greater contribution to the heat release rate. Recall that the peak
rate of increase in heat release rate, which was approximately 30 kW/s, occurred
immediately after ignition in the pallets fuel package. This is also the period before
the pallets have been ignited. Since the fire rapidly consumes the straw, the 18% of
the total energy released by the straw is all released in this initial period, whereas
72
the energy content of the pallets is released over the rest of the duration of the test.
Q = ∆Hcmfuel (5.1)
Note that the theoretical total energy released, 1.26 GJ, is greater than the
computed total energy released, which was 0.95 GJ. This represents a roughly 24%
difference. if this difference was a result of unburned fuel, it would correspond to
approximately 16.1 kg of unburned pallets. It is possible that this discrepancy is a
result of unburned fuel, the uncertainty of the calorimeter, or both.
The OSB exhibited both a higher peak heat release rate and higher 7 ft.
temperatures than the pallets and straw experiments. Immediately after ignition,
the two fires develop similarly, which is consistent with expectations, since the OSB
fuel package is ignited in a similar manner to the pallets and straw. The addition
of OSB to the pallets and straw fuel package is responsible not only for the increase
in total energy released, but is also responsible for the maintenance of a high HRR
for a longer period of time than the pallets, resulting in a greater total energy
release. The greater total energy release is unsurprising, since the two OSB sheets
that were added each weigh as much as another pallet. A theoretical total energy
released can be estimated using the fuel weights from Experiment 8 and the same
method described above for the pallets. Assuming the sheets of OPB have the
same heat of combustion as pine, which is reasonable since the primary composition
of OSB is wood, the total mass of wood is 99.5 kg. The mass of straw is 13.9
kg. This yields a theoretical total energy release of 2.13 GJ. The addition of the
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OSB sheets results in an approximately 90% increase in the potential energy, so
the increase in measured total energy release describe in Section 3.3.1 is consistent
with expectations. However, comparison of the OSB and pallets curves in Figure
3.8 shows that the OSB fuel package sustains an elevated HRR for linger than the
pallets, a trend which can also be attributed to the vertically oriented OSB sheets.
These sheets are exposed to the high heat fluxes in the plume of the fuel package,
and the high surface area available for heating and the vertical orientation, which
is conducive to flame spread, enable the maintenance of a higher heat release rate
for a longer period of time than the pallets ands straw alone.
The temperature profiles and heat release rate histories observed in the fur-
nished room fires indicate that the fire does not exhibit a period of rapid growth
immediately after ignition. Rather, flame spread from the point of origin, which
in this case was the corner of the couch, is rather slow. This is because the flame
spread is not aided by geometry, as it is in the training fuel packages. in contrast to
the training fuels, most of the fuel in the furnished room is located in the lower half
of the room, meaning that flame spread most occur laterally to involve additional
fuels. Whereas the contribution to the heat release rate from the OSB sheets in the
plume is largely due to convective heat transfer, the fuels in the furnished room are
heated primarily by means of radiation, both from the thermal layer and the seat
of the fire. Consider Figure 5.1, which shows the IR camera view of the fire growth
for the first 4 minutes of Experiment 5. The fire remains confined to the couch of
origin for the first 4 minutes after ignition, when the arm of the second couch begins
to burn. By this time, the fire is already quite large, but the heat transfer to other
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fuels within the room is not efficient, since this heat transfer is radiative in nature.
Radiative heat flux decreases rapidly as distance from the source increases. So, even
fuels that are close to the couch of origin, such as the second couch and the coffee
table, are not ignited until a majority of the first couch is involved. By this time,
the thermal layer has descended can be visualized by observing the couch along the
back wall of the fire room. The color of the couch becomes progressively brighter
as the surface temperature of the fabric increases due to heating. For the first 3
minutes of the experiment, the cushion of the couch that is closer to the seat of the
fire is noticeably brighter than the further cushion. As the thermal layer descends,
heating the second couch from above, the heating of the couch is more homoge-
neous, as indicated by the even coloring in the final three frames. This illustrates
the contribution that thermal radiation from the hot gas layer has on fuels remote
from the ignition point.
The heat release rate profiles in Section 3.3.1 showed that the heat release
rate of the furnished room increased nearly 5 times as rapidly as the training fuels.
The reason for this increased rate of growth is likely the fuel composition. The
furniture was composed mostly of synthetic materials, such as polyurethane and
polystyrene. These materials have different combustion characteristics than wood-
based material [36]. A simple estimate of the potential energy can be performed
by considering the contents of the furnished room as one of two materials: wood
or polyurethane. Polyurethane has a heat of combustion of 23.90 MJ/kg [36]. If
the couch and chairs are considered to be comprised of only polyurethane and the
tables are considered to be comprised completely of pine wood, the total potential
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(a) 1:00 (b) 2:00
(c) 3:00 (d) 3:30
(e) 4:00 (f) 4:30
Figure 5.1: Fire Spread From Couch of Origin for Experiment 5
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energy release would be 3.96 GJ. This fuel load is significantly larger than either
of the other two fuel loads, and this larger amount of fuel helps contribute to the
growth.
One of the most important differences between training fuels and fuels repre-
sentative of those found in modern homes are that in the training fuels, the rapid
initial growth is facilitated by the geometry of the fuel package. The pallets and
OSB are arranged in such a way that once a sufficient quantity of straw is involved
in the fire, these fuels begin to pyrolyze and burn. The result is a rapid, but not
asymptotic, climb to the peak heat release rate. In the furniture fires, on the other
hand, the growth to the peak heat release rate occurs when the hot gas layer has
banked down sufficiently to heat fuels remote from the point of origin to the point
where they pyrolyze. As these fuels begin to pyrolyze and burn, they contribute to
the gas layer, increasing the heat release rate, and thus the temperature of the layer.
This transition to the peak pre-ventilation thermal conditions of the fire is approx-
imately 5 times faster than was noted in either of the training fuel experiments.
The rate of this growth is significant because it occurs more quickly than firefighters
would be able to recognize and react to it. If students do not recognize the difference
in growth between furnished fires and training fires, they may be unprepared for it
on the fire ground.
In the context of the training fire evolution, the timing of the growth of the
fire is important. In a typical training evolution, the fire would be ignited by an
instructor or a stoker and allowed to develop for a period of time before allowing
the trainees to begin the evolution. Even after the determination is made that the
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evolution can begin, there is likely to be an additional delay before the firefighters
actually approach the fire compartment because of the time associated with various
fireground tasks such as hoseline advancement. Consider the heat release rate and
fire room temperature and heat flux charts for the fire room ventilation experiments
in Figure 5.2. In the pallets and straw, there is no significant increase in either
temperature or heat flux at any point in the test. In the OSB, there is a more
significant increase, but this increase is noted early in the experiment, possibly
before the firefighters make entry. This would mean that the trainees would not
experience a rapid change in thermal conditions. Rather, the changes in heat flux
and temperature would be more gradual. Inspection of the furnished room heat flux
and temperature profiles reveals that there is a rather quick change in temperature
and heat flux, and this increase is experienced later in the experimental time line. In
a furnished room, the transition to these more severe thermal conditions would be
well within the firefighters timeframe, and would have the potential to harm them.
Consider Figure 5.3, which shows the growth of the pallets and straw fire
as the instructors would see it compared to the development of the temperatures.
The temperature charts reveal that the most rapid growth, particularly at higher
elevations within the room, occurs within the first 60 seconds. At this time, the fire
is not very visually impressive: the majority of the fuel burning at this time is still
the straw, and the pallets are not yet well involved. An instructor may not think
that the training fire is developed enough to begin the evolution. At 90 seconds or
120 seconds from ignition, the pallets have become more involved, but at this point,
the growth rate of the ceiling temperatures has dramatically decrease, approaching
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(a) Room 201 Heat Flux (b) Room 202 Heat Flux

























(c) Room 201 3 ft. Temperatures

























(d) Room 202 3 ft. Temperatures
Figure 5.2: Heat Flux and 3 ft. Temperatures for Fire Room Ventilation Experiments.
Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black
dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as
the corresponding solid line.
a steady state. Consider that the instructor elected to start the evolution at 90
seconds, when visually, the pallets are beginning to become involved. Assuming that
the students take 30 seconds to advance into the fire compartment, the growth of the
fire has already reached a steady state, and the students will not be exposed to any
sort of significant temperature rise during their evolution. Thus, visual observation
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of a training fuel package is a counterintuitive indicator of the appropriate time to
begin a training evolution, if the goal is to expose students to a growing fire, as they
would likely encounter on the fireground [5,6].
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(a) 30 Seconds (b) 60 Seconds (c) 90 Seconds




































































































































(g) 120 Seconds (h) 150 Seconds (i) 180 Seconds




































































































































Figure 5.3: Visual Growth of Pallets vs. Temperature Development
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5.1.2 Training Fuels Do Not Create Thermal Conditions Consistent
With Flashover
In recent years, several firefighter line of duty death or injury incidents have
occurred where failure to identify worsening thermal conditions has been identified as
a contributing factor. Thus, if firefighter trainees are entering a training structure
after the initial growth of the training fire, they may be missing an important
concept: that worsening thermal conditions are a dangerous situation that may
require a re-evaluation of strategy. The possible lack of a rapidly growing fire due
to training evolution timelines highlights another important discrepancy between
training fuels and fuels that are representative of those found on the fireground:
since training fuels are restricted to wood products, in order to be compliant with
NFPA 1403, they lack the heat content of the synthetic materials commonly found
on the modern fireground. The adage “You are not fighting your grandfather’s fire
anymore” [6] emphasizes the fact that the fuels that firefighters use to train have
less potential for hazard than those they would encounter on the fireground. For
example, compare the maximum thermal conditions noted in each of the fuels.
The thermal conditions observed in each of the three furnished room experi-
ments were consistent with post-flashover conditions, which are commonly defined
as 20 kW/m2 to the floor or 600◦C [37] at the ceiling. Other sources define the onset
of flashover as 590◦C in the upper layer. This “upper layer temperature” comes from
a simple, two-zone compartment fire model. This model assumes that there are two
thermal zones, a hot upper layer and a cooler, lower layer. Each zone is a single,
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homogeneous temperature, and the two zones are separated by an interface, whose
height is labeled zint. While it is important to recognize that the two zone model
is merely an approximation, and that the actual temperature profile within a room
is continuous profile, knowledge of the height of the interface and the approximated
gas layer temperature, Tu, can give a simple, useful insight into the temperature
profile within the room. Several methods exist for predicting the interface height
of the hot gas layer, and the resulting temperature of said layer. One method used
is outlined in the FDS Validation guide [38]. In this method, the floor-to-ceiling
temperature profile is considered to be a continuous function, T (z). Integration of
T (z) from the floor (z = 0) to the height of the room, H, yields a quantity, I1. Using
the assumption that the upper and lower gas layers are each a uniform temperature
throughout, it can then be said that the I1 is then equal to the sum of two terms:
the product of the upper gas layer temperature and the distance between the inter-
face height and the height of the room and the lower gas layer temperature and the




T (z)dz = (H − zint)Tu + zintTl (5.2)
A similar method can be used to calculate a second term, I2. In this instance,
rather than integrating the temperature profile, the integral of the inverse of the
temperature profile is taken. Using the same assumption as stated above, I2 is
defined as shown in Equation 5.3. By solving for zint, the interface height, and
combining the two equations, an expression for the interface height is then obtained,
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as shown in Equation 5.4. In this equation, I1 and I2 are defined above, H is the
height of the room, and Tl is the temperature of the lower gas layer. It assumed















I1 + I2T 2l − 2TlH
(5.4)
The layer interface height as a function of time for each of the experiments
is presented in Appendix A.Once the interface height has been calculated, the hot
gas layer temperature can then be computed by integrating the temperature profile,
T (z), from the interface height, zint, to the ceiling height, H, and dividing by the







For these experiments, integration for the I1 and I2 terms, and for Tu, was
performed numerically using a right hand scheme. The thermocouple trees had
thermocouples every 1 foot from 1 foot off the ground to 7 feet from the ground (1
foot from the ceiling). Each thermocouple was assumed to define the temperature
for 6 inches in either vertical direction from the thermocouple. Additionally, the 1
foot and 7 foot thermocouples were assumed to cover the 1 foot space between the
sensor and the floor or ceiling. The resulting hot gas layer temperature profiles can
be used to explain the flashover phenomenon of the three fuels.
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Figure 5.4, which shows the floor heat flux in the fire room for the furnished
room experiments, shows that the heat flux criteria for flashover is exceeded for
each of these tests. In Experiment 2, the maximum temperature recorded at the 3
ft. level was 598.9 ◦C and the heat flux to the floor in Room 201 was 80.2 kW/m2.
These conditions are typical of those that would be observed in a post-flashover
compartment fire. In Experiments 5 and 1, conditions consistent with the onset
of flashover were noted noted prior to ventilation, but after ventilation, the 3 ft.
temperature and floor heat flux were 69.3 kW/m2 and 726.0◦C and 69.7 kW/m2
and 954.6◦C for Experiments 5 and 1, respectively. These are also consistent with
a post-flashover fire.





























(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature

























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.4: Floor Heat Flux and Hot Gas Layer Temperature in Room 201 for Furnished
Room Experiments. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which
is denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line
of the same color as the corresponding solid line.
Peak thermal conditions in the fire room for the training fuels were never
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consistent with the onset of flashover or with post-flashover conditions. The training
fuel scenario that came the closest to replicating these conditions was the fire room
ventilation scenario for the OSB fire, which exhibited a peak heat flux of 19.3 kW/m2
and a peak 7 ft. temperature of 714◦C, observed after fire room ventilation. While
these conditions are severe, they did not precipitate transition to flashover. There
are several possible reasons that the fire in this case was unable to transition to
flashover. Since the gas layer temperature was lower than 600◦C, which can be seen
in Figure 5.5, which is used as an approximation of the autoignition temperature of
carbon monoxide, the gases in the upper layer were not at a high enough temperature
to burn. If the gas layer temperature was higher, then these gases may have been
able to burn remotely from the seat of the fire, as was seen in the furnished room
fires. The additional heat release afforded by the burning gases may have resulted
in conditions consistent with flashover. Similarly, although the heat flux to the floor
was quite high in the fire room, there was no fuel along the floor that was exposed
to this flux. In the furnished rooms, most of the fuel was located close to the floor,
meaning that it was exposed to radiation from the gas layer, which heated these
fuels to their pyrolysis points. In the OSB fire, all of the fuel is concentrated in the
fuel package. so, while radiation from the layer contributes to the heating of the fuel
package, this heating does not have the same contribution to fire growth as in the
furnished rooms. Thus, it can be said that in addition to the greater amount of fuel
that is present in the furnished room, this fuel is in a more efficient arrangement for
radiant heat from the thermal layer to precipitate additional pyrolysis and growth
of the thermal layer, transitioning the room to flashover.
86




























(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature
























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.5: Floor Heat Flux and Hot Gas Layer Temperature in Room 201 for OSB Ex-
periments. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted
by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same
color as the corresponding solid line.
The other training fuel experiments exhibited considerably lower heat fluxes
and maximum gas layer temperatures. In Experiment 4, the maximum temperature
recorded was 683◦C and the maximum heat flux was 13.4 kW/m2. In the pallets and
straw fires, the 7 ft. temperature never exceeded 560◦C and the peak fire room heat
fluxes never exceeded 8 kW/m2. It is possible that with additional fuel, the OSB
experiments would have been able to achieve conditions consistent with flashover.
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(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature

























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.6: Floor Heat Flux and Hot Gas Layer Temperature in Room 201 for Pallets
Experiments. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is de-
noted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of
the same color as the corresponding solid line.
Among the requirements set forth in NFPA 1403 is, The fuel load shall be lim-
ited to avoid conditions that could cause an uncontrolled flashover or backdraft [7].
Given the flashover conditions that were noted in each of the furnished room ex-
periments, it is obvious that a full room of furniture would not be permissible with
NFPA 1403. The pallets and the OSB, however, did not exhibit conditions consis-
tent with flashover. Although the criteria for flashover were not reached, thermal
conditions in the fire room were still quite severe, with heat fluxes to the floor above
13 kW/m2 at their peak. Thus, while NFPA 1403 restricts fuels from creating un-
controlled flashover conditions, the severe, potentially hazardous conditions present
in the fire room in the OSB fires are still permissible. When considering the poten-
tial for flashover, the functional fidelity of the training fuels is low, since neither fuel
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load produced conditions consistent with flashover, as was noted in the furnished
rooms. This should be viewed as a positive aspect, however, since flashover in train-
ing fires is undesirable for a number of reasons, including safety and NFPA 1403
compliance. Since the thermal conditions noted in the furnished room fires were
more severe than those noted in the OSB and pallets experiments, the training fires
it would be expected that the training fires would have a low physical fidelity.
5.1.3 Fires in Concrete Training Buildings Do Not Exhibit Ventilation-
Limited Decay
Traditionally, firefighters were taught that the life cycle of a fire consisted of
four stages, as shown in the left image in Figure 5.7. These four stages were ignition,
growth, fully developed, and decay. These stages were somewhat independent of
fire department intervention, and decay was said to either occur when the fuel
was totally burned away or when water was applied to the fire. Among the tactical
considerations identified in recent fire dynamics research [5,6] is that this traditional
fire growth curve taught to firefighters is not indicative of the time-temperature
profiles noted in residential fires with modern furnishings. Rather, the development
of the fire is better described by the chart presented on the right side of Figure 5.7 [6].
The difference between the two charts reflects the increased demand for oxygen in the
combustion of modern, synthetic fuels. Table 5.1 lists the stoichiometric oxygen to
fuel mass ratios for three wood products (pine, oak, and Douglas fir) and four types
of flexible polyurethane foam, representative of the foam that would be found in
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the couches or chairs in the furnished room. On average, the polyurethane products
require just less than twice as much oxygen for complete combustion than the wood
products. This means that, for equal masses of fuel and a constant rate of air
entrainment, combustion of polyurethane results in less efficient combustion.
(a) Legacy (b) Modern
Figure 5.7: Legacy Fire Curve vs. Modern Fire Curve
Table 5.1: Required Oxygen for Stoichiometric Combustion vs. Available Oxygen in
Structure
Material Formula ΨO
Wood (pine) CH1.7O0.83 1.21
Wood (oak) CH1.7O0.72N0.001 1.35
Wood (Douglas fir) CH1.7O0.74N0.002 1.32
GM21 PU Foam CH1.8O0.30N.05 2.24
GM23 PU Foam CH1.8O0.35N.06 2.11
GM25 PU Foam CH1.8O0.32N.07 2.16
GM27 PU Foam CH1.8O0.30N.08 2.21
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These ratios in Table 5.1 can be used to estimate the amount of air required
for stoichiometric combustion of the fuel packages used in these experiments. The
ΨO values for pine can be used to approximate the wood products, such as pallets,
straw, and the wooden furniture, and polyurethane can be used to represent the
synthetic materials, such as the couches and chairs. Note that this method assumes
that the couch and chairs are homogeneously made of polyurethane, which is not
the case, since the couches have a wood frame. Since the exact weights of each
component of the furniture items is unknown, however, this assumption will suffice.
Equation 5.6 shows how the product of the ΨO values in Table 5.1 and the weight of
the fuel component give the total mass of oxygen that is required for stoichiometric
combustion. Dividing this value by the density yields the volume of oxygen required,
which can then be divided by the volume fraction of oxygen in ambient air to find
the volume of air that is required for stoichiometric combustion of the fuel package.
Table 5.2 lists these results for the three fuel packages, assuming all wood is pine






Vair,stoich = VO2,stoich/Φair (5.7)
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Table 5.2: Required Oxygen for Stoichiometric Combustion vs. Available Oxygen in
Structure
Material Mass of Fuel Vol. O2 Required for Stoich. Vol. Air Required for Stoich.
(kg) combustion (m3) Combustion (m3)
Pallets 54.3 49 236
OSB 99.5 118 564
Funriture 92.5 (wood), 140.0 (polyurethane) 302 1446
The pallets and straw fire requires the least amount of oxygen for complete
combustion to occur. The larger fuel mass in the OSB fuel package required a
corresponding greater volume of oxygen for complete combustion. The furnished
room required the most oxygen for complete combustion, roughly 3 times more
than OSB and 6 times more than furniture. This large difference is a result of both
the larger weight of fuel in the furnished room but also the increased amount of
oxygen that is needed for these fuels to burn to completion.
Compare these figures to the volume of the concrete burn structure, which is
approximately 537m3.If the amount of oxygen present at the time of ignition inside
of the structure is less than the amount that is required, the fire will become un-
derventilated, and decay if no additional ventilation is provide, hence the differently
shaped curves in Figure 5.7. From the results of Table 5.2, this would indicate that
the OSB and furnished room fuel packages would not be able to burn to completion,
assuming no additional ventilation was provided.
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The temperature profiles in the training fires in the concrete burn building
in these experiments were more representative of the legacy fire curve than the
modern fire curve, even in the experiments featuring furniture as fuel. This trend
is most evident in the no ventilation experiments, where no doors or windows were
opened during hte duration of the test. The 7 ft. temperature profiles for the
no ventilation experiments are shown in Figure 5.8. These experiments did not
display the ventilation-limited decay identified in compartment fires [5, 6]. Rather,
temperatures continuously increased until reaching a plateau. This would indicate
that the burn building is not well sealed, and indeed there is a significant amount
of leakage through the built in openings of the structure, such as the scuppers.
Figure 5.8: 7 ft. Temperatures for No Vent Experiments
While these built-in openings are small when compared to a window or door,
the total area of these openings sums becomes significant, as shown in Table 5.3.
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The total leakage area across the three floors of the building is 821.5 in2, which
would be equivalent to a small window. These openings allow the free flow of air
into the structure, meaning that instead of a fixed amount of oxygen present in the
building, as would be the case in a well-sealed residential structure [39], there is a
constant source of fresh air for the fire to draw upon. in the concrete burn building
experiments, this constant flow of air was confirmed by the bidirectional probes in
the fire room doorway.
Table 5.3: Leakage Areas for Concrete Structure




The doorway gas velocities for the no vent experiments are shown in Figure
5.9 for the pallets and straw and the furnished room. The velocities for the no
ventilation experiments are consistent with a bidirectional flow path, with oxygen
entering the fire room low, indicated by the negative velocities, and products of
combustion being exhausted out of the top of the doorway, indicated by the positive
velocities. In a well-sealed residential home, if no exterior ventilation was provided,
these velocities would be expected to decrease as the oxygen concentration decreased,
a trend identified in [6]. This reduction in velocity was not seen, indicating that the
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(a) Pallets and Straw





































Figure 5.9: Fire Room Door Velocities. Probes are spaced equidistantly inside the door,
at 13 inches, 26 inches, 39 inches, 52 inches, and 65 inches from the ground.
Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black
dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as
the corresponding solid line.
fires in the concrete buildings did not enter a decay stage.
The constant supply of air through leakage points affects the oxygen concen-
trations and fire dynamics in the fire room. Recall Figure 4.3, which showed the
oxygen concentrations for the furnished room experiments. Oxygen concentrations
in the rear of the room, where the leakage air from the scuppers was not able to
reach, declined to 5% and remained there for the duration of the experiment. On
the other hand, the oxygen concentrations in the doorway were close to 15% during
this period. This means that oxygen was being provided to the fire room at a high
enough concentration to sustain burning in that area, which is the reason for the
maintenance of high temperatures close to the ceiling seen in Figure 5.8. The oxygen
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concentrations close to the floor, displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, remained close
to ambient concentrations. This means that the fire was not producing a sufficient
amount of combustion products to bank down to the floor level and reduce oxygen
concentrations.
Built-in leakage points, such as the scuppers in the concrete burn building,
are not a feature of the homes to which firefighters would be responding. In the
average residential home, the minimum amount of leakage between the house and
the environment is desirable, as it makes the home the most efficient in terms of
energy [39]. For the same reason, the amount of air that is able to be entrained
into one of these structures is quite small, and when compared to the amount of air
that is able to be entrained into a compartment by a window or door it is negligible.
Thus, in a building such as this, if no exterior ventilation openings are available for
air exchange between the structure and the environment, the only oxygen that is
available for the fire to burn is in the air that is in the structure prior to ignition.
It is important that firefighters recognize and understand this difference. If
firefighters were to make entry into a well-sealed residential structure where the fire
had already begun to decay, they would be greeted initially by less severe thermal
conditions [6]. These conditions are likely to increase in severity as air is allowed
to enter behind the firefighters as they advance in their fire attack. The quickness
of the fire’s response to ventilation depends largely on the thermal conditions at
the time of ventilation and the amount of ventilation that is provided as firefighters
enter the structure, and in some cases can be quite rapid. In contrast to the well-
sealed structures of the modern residential environment, the fire in the concrete
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training building maintains a steady flow of oxygen through the lower part of the
fire room. This means that it is not as starved for oxygen as the fire in the regular
building, and, while the fire does increase in size following ventilation, it is not with
the severity that has been documented in modern residential structures.
5.1.4 Training Fires Have Limited Response to Ventilation
Conventional firefighting tactics have dictated that “venting equals cooling”
[40]. In short, this means that fire department initiated ventilation will result in
the expulsion of products of combustion, and not cause an increase in the size of
the fire. In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift away from this notion,
where it is now widely emphasized that ventilation only results in the improvement
of conditions when the venting occurs in coordination with water application by the
suppression team.
Part of the reason for this misunderstanding can be attributed to the nature
of natural fuels when compared to modern fuels. Kerber [6] conducted experiments
comparing legacy furniture to modern furniture in an identical residential structure.
Among the differences that were noted to the two fires were the peak temperature
and minimum oxygen concentrations noted prior to ventilation, 600◦C and 5% for
the modern fuel and 230◦C and 18% for the legacy fuel. The most important differ-
ence when considering the importance of well-timed ventilation, however, was the
time that elapsed between ventilation and flashover, which was 2 minutes for the
modern fuel and 8 minutes for the legacy fuel. Obviously, the modern fuel responds
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much more quickly to changes in ventilation, whereas the legacy fuel takes approxi-
mately 4 times as long to reach flashover. This is significant because in legacy fires,
there is a significant amount of time for firefighters to get a hoseline in place to
suppress the fire, even in the presence of uncoordinated ventilation. That timeline
is far more constricted in modern fires, where uncoordinated ventilation can result
in untenable conditions for firefighters in full PPE if a hoseline is not in place. Thus,
the modern fire is far less forgiving when considering the timing of ventilation.
Two ventilation cases were examined in these experiments: a remote ventila-
tion case, where the window in Room 204 and the front door on the ground floor
of the structure were opened, and a fire room ventilation case, where the window
in Room 201 was opened. In [6], Kerber additionally examined the effect of vent
location on the response of the fire. These tests indicated that ventilation points
remote from the fire room resulted in a delayed transition to flashover compared to
when the vent point was within the fire room itself.
The trend observed in the furnished room experiments is consistent with the
findings described in [6]. The hot gas layer temperature and heat flux are given in
Figure 5.10. In Experiment 1, which was the test in which the fire room window
was ventilated, it can be seen that the hot gas layer temperature increased dramat-
ically almost immediately upon opening the window. Conditions consistent with
flashover are noted soon after ventilation. In Experiment 5, the remote ventilation
experiment, temperatures take longer to increase following ventilation, finally reach-
ing flashover at close to 150 seconds after ventilation. Both rooms transitioned to
flashover following ventilation, indicating that they were underventilated prior to
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ventilation, although the response of the remote vent case was delayed. Thus, the
furnished room experiments, the post-ventilation fire growth was consistent with
trends noted for similar ventilation configurations conducted in wood-framed resi-
dential structures.





























(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature

























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.10: Hot Gas Layer Temperature and Heat Flux to Floor in Fire Room for Fur-
nished Room Experiments. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation,
which is denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a
dotted line of the same color as the corresponding solid line.
In the OSB experiments, the fidelity of the post-ventilation temperature trend
varied between the two ventilation scenarios. In Experiment 8, which was the fire
room ventilation case, the hot gas layer temperature increased by approximately 100
◦C following ventilation. Additionally, there is a notable increase in the floor heat
flux from 10 kW/m2 to 15 kW/m2 in Room 201 immediately following fire room
ventilation. This increase is consistent with that noted in Experiment 1. After
the initial increase, floor heat flux in the fire room increases to over 19 kW/m2
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before beginning to decay as the fire runs out of fuel. Figure 5.11 shows the hot
gas layer temperatures and floor heat flux histories for Experiments 1 and 8. So,
there was a significant increase in both hot gas layer temperature and floor heat flux
in the fire room, although these increases were not nearly as severe as those noted
in the furnished room fires. As a result of the smaller magnitude of this increase,
the increase in thermal conditions in rooms adjacent to the fire room was not as
noticeable as the increase within the fire room itself. Figure 5.12 shows the heat
flux and hot gas layer temperature in Room 202 for the near vent experiments.
Inspection of the heat flux graph indicates that the increase in heat flux from just
over 1 kW/m2 to 4 kW/m2 that occurs as the fire room flashes over is not noted
in the OSB fire, where the heat flux steadily increases from just below 1 kW/m2 to
just over 1.5kW/m2. Thus, ventilation results in an increase in temperatures and
heat flux readings in the fire room, although this increase is not as severe as that
noted in the furnished room experiments, especially as the distance from the fire
room is increased.
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(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature
























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.11: Hot Gas Layer Temperature and Heat Flux for Near Ventilation in Fur-
niture and OSB. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is
denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line
of the same color as the corresponding solid line.




























(a) Room 202 Hot Gas Layer Temperature























(b) Room 202 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.12: Hot Gas Layer Temperature and Heat Flux for Near Ventilation in Fur-
niture and OSB. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is
denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line
of the same color as the corresponding solid line.
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In Experiment 4, where the ventilation was performed remotely from the OSB
fire, there was not as significant of an increase in heat flux following ventilation.
Following the ventilation of the Room 204 window and the front door, the fire
room heat fluxes continue to increase following ventilation, but there is no rapid
increase, as was observed in Experiment 8. Rather, there is a steady increase from
a flux of 10 kW/m2 at the time of ventilation to just over 13 kW/m2 at the peak.
Following this peak, the fire room heat flux decreased steadily until the end of the
test. A similar trend was noted in the hot gas layer temperatures for Experiment 4.
Following ventilation, the hot gas layer temperatures remained steady around 400
◦C, before decreasing in a manner similar to the heat flux. The temperatures and
heat fluxes in Experiment 5 followed a separate trend. The heat flux and hot gas
layer temperatures for Experiments 4 and 5 are shown in Figure 5.13. Following
ventilation, the hot gas layers steadily increased, though not as rapidly as in the
fire room ventilation case. The heat flux behavior following ventilation showed an
increase to a local peak before increasing to flashover conditions.
The primary difference between these two fuels is the absence of a single, well
mixed layer of unburned fuel in the OSB. The oxygen concentration profiles listed
in Figure 4.2 for the OSB fires indicate that two distinct zones exist for the duration
of the experiment: an upper layer with elevated temperatures and reduced oxygen
concentrations and a lower layer with lower temperatures and oxygen concentrations
close to ambient levels. In the furnished room fires, this two zone phenomenon is
not observed, as evidenced by the low oxygen concentrations and high temperatures
at the 2 ft. level. When fresh air is introduced to the oxygen-depleted, fuel-rich gas
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(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature
























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.13: Hot Gas Layer Temperature and Heat Flux for Near Ventilation in Fur-
niture and OSB. Solid lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is
denoted by a black dot. Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line
of the same color as the corresponding solid line.
layer in the furnished room fires, burning is able to occur within the gas layer itself.
Recall in Table 5.2, where the amount of air required for stoichiometric combustion
was roughly 3 times the volume of the building. The incomplete combustion that
results from this discrepancy means that not all of the gaseous fuel is able to burn,
forming a fuel-rich thermal layer that is deficient in oxygen. Once oxygen is provided
via ventilation, there is still a great deal of fuel mass to burn.
This fuel rich thermal layer was not observed in the OSB experiments, which is
consistent with the analysis in table 5.2, since the mass of fuel, and the amount of air
required for complete combustion of this fuel, was not as high as the furnished fuel
package. The gas layer in the OSB fires is not hot enough to burn, except for areas
close to the fuel package itself. There are several possible reasons that the gas layer
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is not hot enough to burn. One possible reason is the thick, concrete walls of the
training building, which have different thermal properties than the gypsum board
found on residential surfaces. Concrete takes considerably more energy to heat up
than gypsum board, as evidenced by the thermal inertia values: 2.8 (kW/m2K)2s
for concrete compared to 0.18(kW/m2K)2s for gypsum board [37]. As the hot gases
travel from the fire room along the ceiling, they lose energy to the concrete block
walls and ceiling, resulting in a cooler hot gas layer in areas remote from the fire
room. In addition to the cooling action of the concrete block, as air travels from
the ventilation point to the seat of the fire, mixing occurs between the fresh air
and the hot gases closer to the ceiling. In addition to entraining oxygen into the
layer, this also cools these hotter gases. The cooling that occurs to the gas layer
by a combination of heat removal via the concrete surfaces and mixing with the
cool, fresh air results in a gas layer that is not hot enough to burn, as was noted
in the furnished room fires. This cooler gas layer explains the dampened response
to ventilation noted in the near ventilation case, and the lack of any significant fire
growth in the remote ventilation case.
The pallets and straw exhibited negligible growth following both methods of
ventilation. Figure 5.14 shows the hot gas layer temperatures and heat flux histories
for the pallets and straw experiments. Inspection of these charts reveals that the
burnout experiment and the remote ventilation experiment behaved quite similarly,
even following remote ventilation. The similarity of the temperature-time profiles
would indicate that the remote ventilation had no significant impact on the tem-
peratures or heat flux in the fire room. It would follow that the temperatures and
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heat fluxes elsewhere in the training building would be similarly unimpacted. The
fire in Experiment 7 developed differently than the other two pallets and straw fires,
not reaching as high of an initial peak. Inspection of the temperature and heat flux
profiles, however, indicates that the heat flux curve is nearly unimpacted, and the
hot gas layer temperature merely fluctuates between the time of ventilation and the
end of the experiment. The absence of change resulting from ventilation is likely
because the gas layer is not hot enough to sustain combustion, but also because the
rate at which the pallets and straw fuel package produces products of combustion is
less than the rate that smoke and hot gases are being exhausted from the building.
Additionally, recall that the natural ventilation openings within the structure pro-
vide a continuous source of fresh air to the fire, even when all ventilation openings
are closed. The pallets and straw fuel package required the least amount of air for
complete combustion (Table 5.2, and since the fire already has a continuous supply
of air, the additional ventilation provided by the window did not have as drastic of
an effect towards increasing combustion as it would for the other two fuels, which
have a higher synthetic content. These synthetic materials, such as polyurethane,
have a higher oxygen demand, as discussed previously.
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(a) Room 201 Hot Gas Layer Temperature

























(b) Room 201 Floor Heat Flux
Figure 5.14: Hot Gas Layer Temperature and Heat Flux for Pallets and Straw. Solid
lines represents data prior to ventilation, which is denoted by a black dot.
Post-ventilation data is denoted by a dotted line of the same color as the
corresponding solid line.
The response of the fire to ventilation is an important aspect when considering
the fidelity with which training fuels simulate the fire dynamics created in a furnished
room fire common of a residential house. Fires using furniture as a fuel tend to
exhibit increases in temperatures and heat flux in areas close to the fire room. The
closer the ventilation to the seat of the fire, the more rapid the response. In both the
remote ventilation case and the fire room ventilation case the fire room eventually
transitioned to flashover. The reason for this behavior can be attributed both to
the high synthetic content of the fuel and the larger total mass of fuel in the fuel
package. The high oxygen demand of the fuel results in underventilated conditions,
and growth following the introduction of additional oxygen.
The OSB fires demonstrated a limited increase in temperatures and heat fluxes
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corresponding with ventilation for the near ventilation case. In the remote ventila-
tion case, however, there was no noticeable growth that occurred following remote
ventilation. It is likely that the hot gas layer temperature decreased below the point
where additional oxygen would have enabled burning. The pallets and straw ex-
hibited negligible growth following ventilation. Although the oxygen concentrations
of the OSB fuel package indicated that two zones were maintained throughout the
experiment, it is possible that the evacuation of smoke that occurred as a result of
fire room window ventilation allowed for a local increase in burning, which may have
been responsible for the increase in thermal conditions. Thus, it can be said that
the OSB fuel package had some dependence on ventilation. The fire behavior of
the pallets and straw fires, on the other hand, was largely unaffected by ventilation,
meaning that this fire could be considered fuel limited. The difference between these
two training fuels helps to illustrate the importance of fuel control when conducting
a training evolution. The addition of fuel can result not only in more severe thermal
conditions in the period leading up to ventilation, but the rapid deterioration of
conditions following ventilation.
It is important that the ventilation response of these fuels be put into context
when firefighters use them in training evolutions. If ventilation is incorporated into
a training scenario, it is important that instructors clarify that, in the absence
of suppression, ventilation actions may have a more severe impact on fireground
conditions and firefighter tenability on the actual fireground with modern fuels than
they did in the training scenario using training fuels. Instructors may consider using
additional fuel packages that could be ignited in a timeframe consistent with the
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growth of a fire in a furnished room to artificially simulate an increase in thermal
conditions due to ventilation. In such scenarios, it is important that instructors
recognize that the goal of the training simulation should not be to create conditions
consistent with a furnished room fire, but rather to replicate the response of the fire
to firefighters’ actions on the fireground. Such a balance between fidelity and safety
is considered in the following section.
5.2 Safety
Utech’s thermal operating classes were used to quantify the severity of the
thermal conditions present in the training fires and the furniture fires. In order
to quantify the most serious conditions that were present in each experiment, the
peak temperature at the 3 ft. level and the heat flux value that was recorded at
the same time as this peak temperature were used to classify the thermal hazard
according to Utech’s method. It should be noted that Utech’s thermal operating
classes display radiant flux along the x-axis, but in these experiments, the heat flux
gauges measured total heat flux. Since the heat flux was measured at the floor level,
away from any gas flows of significant temperature, it is reasonable to assume that
this total heat flux measurement is a good approximation of the radiative flux.
Figure 5.15 shows where the peak values for each of the furniture, OSB, and
pallets and straw experiments fell on Utech’s chart. The furniture fires peaks fell well
within the Emergency operating condition, which is consistent with expectations,
since each of the furnished room experiments exhibited conditions consistent with
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flashover. The OSB fires each fell towards the lower end of the emergency operating
range. Note that for one of the OSB tests, Experiment 4, the temperature criteria
was within the range of Emergency conditions, while the heat flux criteria met
that of ordinary operating conditions. While, technically, this peak falls into an
intermediate area between the ordinary and emergency operating classes. Each of
the pallets and straw fires were within the ordinary operating range.




























Figure 5.15: Thermal Operating Conditions in Fire Room (Room 201)
This illustrates an important difference between the two training fuels: OSB
and pallets and straw. Since the operating class for the pallets and straw is within
ordinary operating conditions, instructors and stokers would be able to operate in
the fire room for periods of time without risking thermal injury. This would allow
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these firefighters to maintain the fuel package or instruct students as necessary.
Additionally, it allows a certain margin of error for newer recruits, who would be
able to be in the fire room if they became lost or disoriented, or if they were unable
to apply water to the fire. In the OSB training fires, however, the fire room is only
habitable for mere seconds before firefighters risk compromising their turnout gear.
Further, the margin of error for students is not as great as in the pallets and straw
fire. If a recruit firefighter were to make a mistake or become disoriented, they
may find themselves in a more hazardous environment. While the peak thermal
conditions are not nearly as severe in the OSB fire as they are in the furnished room
fires, they do fall within the same operating class, meaning that there is a similarly
high level of risk.
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Figure 5.16: Thermal Operating Conditions in Room 202
As the distance from the fire room increases, the hazard classification similarly
decreases. Figure 5.16 shows the thermal operating class that the peak temperature
and the heat flux recorded at this time fall into for each experiment. In this room,
two of the three furnished room fires fall within the ordinary operating range, and
the third falls within the heat flux criteria for the normal operating range while
exceeding the temperature criteria. This is consistent with the definition of that
class, that is, the conditions in a room adjacent to one that is flashing over. The
OSB fires exhibited less severe thermal conditions than those in the furniture fires,
with one experiment falling into the routine operating class and the other falling
between the routine and ordinary classes. All of the pallets and straw fires had
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heat fluxes less than 1 kW/m2 at the time that the peak temperature was recorded,
although the temperatures at the 3 ft. level were within routine operating criteria.
Although the peak temperatures were similar between the pallets and the OSB fuels,
the heat flux values were quite different, indicating that radiative heat flux form the
gas layer has more of an effect on thermal conditions in the OSB tests than in the
pallets. So, the furnished room experiments and OSB were the only experiments
where thermal conditions were elevated, whereas the pallets and straw experiments
exhibited much more moderate temperatures in the approach to the fire room.
This highlights another important distinction between training fires and real
fires. In the training fires, and the pallets and straw tests in particular, thermal
conditions were not elevated until in or near the fire room. Thus, a student in full
PPE would be able to approach and enter the fire room before significant thermal
conditions would be noted. The lack of significant thermal conditions in areas remote
from the fire room is further evidenced in Figure 5.17, which shows where the peak
temperatures and their corresponding heat fluxes fall on Figure 2.1. Even for the
furnished fires, where flashover conditions were present only a few rooms over, the
heat fluxes recorded in these locations is quite negligible, and the temperatures are
very low. Studies [5, 6] have indicated that this significant reduction in thermal
conditions on the approach to the fire is not noted in residential fires, particularly
when the firefighters are working in the flow path of the fire. Thus, the situation
where firefighters are exposed to negligible thermal conditions during training is
unlikely to be replicated on the fire ground. It is important that students appreciate
this difference, so as not to breed complacency when responding to fires in real
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structures.


























































Figure 5.17: Thermal Operating Conditions Rooms 203 and 204
One important element that is missing from the thermal operating classes pro-
posed by Utech is the time component. The peak temperatures in Figures 5.15-5.17
offer a mere snapshot in time of the thermal conditions that instructors and stu-
dents would be exposed to. Consider Figure 5.18, which shows the heat flux and
temperature data plotted at the time of ventilation, and at intervals of 30s, 60s,
90s, and 120s. The grouping for the pallets and straw experiments is concentrated
in this region over the time interval, indicating that the pallets and straw fire re-
mains stagnant in the ordinary region in the two minutes following ventilation. In
the furnished room, the thermal conditions within the fire room are already in the
emergency operating range at the time of ventilation, although the severity of con-
ditions increases following ventilation, remaining in the emergency operating zone
for the two minute period. In the OSB experiment, the ordinary conditions were in
the ordinary operating range at the time of ventilation. Over the next two minutes,
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the severity of these conditions increase into the emergency operating range.




































Figure 5.18: Ventilation Response of Fire for Near Vent Experiments. Points are labeled
1,2,3,4, and 5, corresponding to the temperature and heat flux at 0 s, 30 s,
60 s,90 s, and 120 s, respectively.
A similar trend can be seen in the remote ventilation experiments, as seen in
Figure 5.19. Just as in the near ventilation case, the pallets and straw experiments
maintain a tight grouping for the 150 seconds following ventilation. At the time of
ventilation, the conditions in the furnished room met the heat flux criteria for the
ordinary operating range and the temperature criteria for the emergency operating
range. After the first 60 seconds, the temperature crossed into the emergency oper-
ating range. The OSB exhibited a similar trend, starting in the ordinary operating
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class at the time of ventilation, before increasing into the emergency operating class
until the heat flux began to decrease, bringing the thermal conditions into the area
where the temperature exceeds ordinary operating conditions, but the heat flux
meets these criteria. Note also that, while the OSB thermal conditions do increase,
they increase at a more consistent rate than was noted in the near ventilation sce-
nario. This further illustrates the difference between the near ventilation experiment
and the remote ventilation experiment for the OSB.








































Figure 5.19: Ventilation Response of Fire for Near Vent Experiments. Points are labeled
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, corresponding to the temperature and heat flux at 0s, 30s,
60s, 90s, 120s, and 150s, respectively.
Figures 5.18 and 5.19 demonstrate the importance of the time component of
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evaluating the thermal response to firefighters, and highlight the differences in ven-
tilation between the three fuel packages. The pallets and straw thermal conditions
are steady following ventilation, so students or instructors would feel little change
from the action. An increase in the severity of thermal conditions was noted in
the OSB experiments, but this change was more gradual than the rapid change
that was observed in the furnished rooms. Consider the near ventilation case. If
OSB was used as a fuel, students and instructors would be exposed to a gradual
increase in conditions from roughly 160◦C and 10 kW/m2 at the time of ventila-
tion to 265◦C and 19 kW/m2 after two minutes. In the furnished room, thermal
conditions increased from 403◦C and 17 kW/m2 at the time of ventilation to 900◦C
and 130 kW/m2 after only 30 seconds. The increase in conditions in the furnished
room is larger in magnitude and occurs over a shorter span of time, meaning that
firefighters would have less time to react to the worsening conditions. Although
the conditions noted in the OSB tests were severe, they are within the limits of
PPE worn by firefighters [24,25] for short durations. The experiments conducted by
Mensch et al. [26] indicated that the time to SCBA facepiece failure is dependent
on the severity of the thermal exposure. Thus, although the thermal conditions
in the OSB experiments and the furnished room experiments are in the emergency
operating range, and conditions within these rooms could eventually cause failure of
a firefighter’s PPE, the length of time that a firefighter would have until their PPE
was compromised may vary significantly.
The variations in thermal conditions that occur over the duration of the exper-
iments, as well as the time of exposure highlight an important gap in understanding
116
in the thermal operating class method of evaluating firefighter safety. In defining
each class, Utech lists a reference time. The ordinary operating class is defined as
being an area where firefighters could operate for the entire 20 or 30 minute du-
ration of a fire incident [23]. He describes the emergency operating class as one
in which a firefighter can survive in for only a few minutes before suffering burn
injuries. As discussed in the Chapter 2, while firefighter PPE has improved since
the time that Utech proposed the thermal operating classes, the thresholds that
he defined still correspond to the critical temperatures and heat fluxes of various
pieces of firefighter PPE. Furthermore, Figures 5.18 and 5.19 demonstrate that in
fires with modern furnishings, the thermal operating class is not stagnant for the
duration of a fire. In order to fully capture the thermal risk to firefighters during a
training evolution, the analysis would not only have to consider the peak heat flux
and peak temperature, but rather a fractional approach, similar to toxicity calcula-
tions, where the time history of the temperature and heat flux could be considered.
Thus, the most appropriate way of characterizing a firefighter’s thermal exposure
would be to develop a time-dose relationship, which would consider the transient
nature of the thermal conditions at firefighter operating height, the time-dependent
transfer of heat through turnout gear, and the threshold of burns to the skin, or the
failure of various pieces of PPE.
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Chapter 6: Summary
The goal of fire service training is to prepare students for the conditions and
challenges that they face on the fireground. In the constantly evolving modern
fire environment, with more tightly sealed homes and higher-heat release rate fuels,
it is important that training fuels keep up with the trend. Pallets and straw, a
commonly used training fuel in training academies across the United States, are
more representative of a legacy fuel than a modern one. Recognizing this gap, some
instructors have begun to incorporate engineered wood products into their training
fuel packages. While use of these fuels can create fire dynamics more similar to
furnished rooms, they can also create more severe thermal hazards. In order to
better understand the fire dynamics of these training fires, a series of experiments
was conducted in an effort to evaluate the fidelity and safety of two training fuels,
pallets and OSB, and compare these training fuels to modern combustibles similar
to those that would be encountered on the residential fireground.
6.1 Pallets and Straw as Training Fuel
Pallets and straw remains a common training fuel for live fire evolutions in
the United States. The low cost and ease of procurement of these materials makes
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them ideal for stockpile and use in training burns. The results of these experiments,
however, indicated that both the physical and functional fidelity of the pallets and
straw fires were quite low. The temperatures and heat fluxes outside of the fire room
remained much lower than those noted in the furnished room fires. Additionally, the
decrease in oxygen concentrations at the 2 ft. level that was noted in the furnished
room experiments was not noted in the pallets and straw experiments. Further,
when ventilation was initiated, the fire did not increase in size in any appreciable
way, indicating that the burning was likely fuel limited rather than ventilation lim-
ited. The peak thermal conditions noted in the pallets and straw tests fell into the
ordinary operating class, meaning that a firefighter in full PPE would be protected
for short exposures. Because of these less severe thermal conditions, instructors
may elect to use pallets and straw as a training fuel for evolutions involving newer
recruits, such as a Firefighter I class. This would allow these students to practice
firefighting skills while being exposed to heat and smoke while maintaining a margin
of error. Regardless of the evolution, it is essential that instructors using pallets and
straw as a fuel emphasize the differences between a pallets and straw training fire
and a residential fire with modern combustibles, so that bad behaviors developed
on the training ground are not carried over to the fireground.
6.2 Use of Synthetic Materials as Training Fuels
NFPA 1403 specifically prohibits the use of synthetic fuels such as treated wood
products, rubber, plastic, polyurethane foam, upholstered furniture, and chemically
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treated straw. Some instructors, however, have begun to incorporate engineered
wood products, like oriented strand board (OSB), into their training burns in an
effort to create conditions that are more consistent with a furnished fire. The results
of these experiments indicated that the training fires using OSB as a fuel exhibited
a limited degree of functional fidelity to the furnished room fires. In the near ven-
tilation case, temperatures and heat fluxes within the fire room increased following
ventilation in a trend consistent with the furniture fires. Nevertheless, the same re-
sponse was not noted in the remote ventilation case. Since the gas layer in the OSB
experiments was not hot enough to sustain burning, and the compact fuel package
minimized the effect of radiative heating from the gas layer, the same magnitude of
growth noted in the furnished rooms was not observed in the OSB fires.
The OSB fuel package exhibited a higher degree of functional fidelity than the
pallets and straw and the thermal environment created was also more severe, par-
ticularly in the fire room. The peak thermal conditions crossed into the emergency
operating class, meaning that firefighters could only be exposed for a short duration
before suffering burn injuries or death. This is a marked contrast to the pallets and
straw, where instructors or students could operate with a relative degree of safety
in the fire room for longer periods of time. Thus, if OSB is to be used as a training
fuel, it is important that instructors and students maintain a safe distance from
the fire room while a hoseline is in place. Training facilities may want to consider
implementing different policies for OSB evolutions compared to pallets and straw
evolutions. Furthermore, OSB training burns should be reserved for students with
more experience, whose more solid foundation in firefighting skills would allow them
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to benefit from the more realistic, albeit more hazardous, training without putting
themselves in unnecessary harm.
6.3 Physical vs. Functional Fidelity
Fisher [14] describes how the mentality of some fire service instructors is to
pack as much fuel as possible into an evolution in order to create a fire that is as real-
istic as possible. NFPA 1403 recommends against this practice, indicating that the
fuel load should only be large enough to create a fire of the desired size [7]. This dis-
crepancy highlight’s Hartin’s discussion of functional versus physical fidelity. In this
instance, the instructors that Fisher describes are advocating for physical fidelity,
that is, creating a fire that is feels the same as an actual residential fire. By doing
this, instructors are doing their students a disservice, because they may be creating
both conditions that are hazardous to the students while not accurately replicating
a residential fire. Rather, it is important that instructors focus on maximizing the
functional fidelity of a training burn. This facilitates a productive training expe-
rience for students while limiting the fire size to a safe, manageable fuel load in
accordance with NFPA 1403.
6.4 Future Work
These experiments examined the fire behavior of three different fuels in con-
crete training buildings. Concrete training buildings such as the one in this series
of experiments are only one of many types of containers that firefighters conduct
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training in. The behavior of various fuels in these containers should be studied
and compared to their behavior in concrete buildings. The discussion of this study
briefly touched upon the effect of wall linings on heat loss from the hot gas layer
remote from the fire room. This effect would be useful to understand, not only for
training fires, but for fires in all types of compartments.
When considering the safety of firefighters in a thermal environment, the
method of Utech [23] was used. This method considers the thermal threat to the
firefighter in terms of two components: a radiant component and a convective com-
ponent. The convective component is approximated by the temperature in the area
that the firefighter is operating, but this neglects an important facet: the gas veloc-
ity. Higher gas velocities would result in higher convective heat transfer coefficients
and a higher convective heat flux. Furthermore, the thermal threat of the firefighter
should not be considered as an isolated peak event, but rather as a fractional dose,
dependent on both the thermal load and the time of exposure. Thus, future work
should focus on better evaluating the thermal hazard posed to firefighters not only
in a training environment, but on the fireground as well.
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Appendix A: Training Fire Fuel Weights
Experiment Pallet Weights (kg) Straw Weight (kg) Total OSB Weight (kg)
3 n.r. n.r. -
4 18.0, 20.1, 19.1 n.r n.r
6 18.1, 17.1, 16.9 n.r. -
7 17.4, 20.4 15.8 14.7 -
8 18.6, 19.1, 19.5 13.9 42.3
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Appendix A: Thermal Conditions Remote from Fire Room
Table A.1: Peak Heat Fluxes Remote From Fire Room
Experiment
Room 202 Room 203 Room 204
Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent
1 1.34 5.57 0.16 0.47 0.11 0.40
2 4.72 - 0.46 - 0.37 -
3 0.63 0.96 0.04 0.09 0 0.23
4 0.88 1.17 0.06 0.12 0 0.08
5 1.82 4.73 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.46
6 0.71 - 0.07 - 0.08 -
7 0.53 0.79 0.03 0.04 0 0.02
8 0.97 1.86 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.18
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Table A.2: Peak 3 ft. Temperatures Remote From Fire Room
Experiment
Room 202 Room 203 Room 204
Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent Pre-Vent Post-Vent
1 105.3 245.0 45.0 78.1 43.7 60.5
2 176.6 - 53.7 - 52.4 -
3 55.1 72.2 31.1 42.6 30.2 46.7
4 46.9 57.6 31.9 34.2 30.7 31.6
5 100.4 164.0 43.4 67.7 46.1 56.5
6 74.5 - 39.9 - 39.4 -
7 55.1 71.0 33.1 45.4 32.3 41.3
8 67.3 113.8 33.9 56.4 33.3 53.3
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Appendix A: Hot Gas Layer Interface Heights























Figure A.1: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 1
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Figure A.2: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 2
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Figure A.3: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 3
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Figure A.4: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 4
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Figure A.5: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 5
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Figure A.6: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 6
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Figure A.7: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 7
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Figure A.8: Upper Gas Layer Interface for Experiment 8
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